Question Question
Criminal Law – Briefing a Case
In McLaughlin v. Florida we will identify and define the key components of a court opinion. Following this, we will locate these parts in an actual judicial opinion. The case summary process is known as “briefing a case”. The written summary is a case brief. To write a case brief there are six main parts to focus on:
1. Citation – case name including court and year of decision
2. Prior Proceedings – States what happened in court before the current court’s decision, such as the crime defendant was convicted of committing, the statute she violated, and sentence she received
3. Facts – Specific details of the case that led to the filing of criminal charges against the
defendant. The who, when, where, how, what and why of the incident.
4. Issue – Statement of legal questions that the court is asked to address in the specific
case. Generally speaking, the court is being asked to answer a question by the appellant- the side that lost in the court that previously heard the case. An issue may involve a question about the interpretation of a constitutional right, whether the trial court provided the proper instructions of law to the jury, or whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
5. Holding-The holding is the statement of the court’s decision. Examples of case disposition include “affirmed” or “reversed and remanded”. This language usually appears at the end of the case. AGRCE OR DISAGREE
6. Rationale – The rationale is an explanation of the court’s reasoning for reaching its decision. The court’s reasoning may include a range of factors, including prior case law (precedent) or public policy. Judicial opinions typically offer more than one rationale for their decision.
Please also look for the Concurring and Dissenting opinions at the end of the case, if provided.
Concurring Opinion – The opinion of a Judge or Judges who agree with the decision of the Judges who are in the majority, but for different legal reasons.
Dissenting Opinion – The opinion of a Judge or Judges who disagree with the legal decision and findings of the Judges in the majority.
Lecture Lecture Lecture Lecture
McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) U.S. Supreme Court 379 U.S. 184 Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case is the validity of a conviction under s 798.05 of the Florida statutes, F.S.A., providing that: Any negro man and White woman, or any White man and negro woman, who are not married to each other, who shall habitually live in and occupy in the nighttime the same room shall each be punished by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars. Because the section applies only to a White person and a Negro who commit the specified acts and because no couple other than one made up of a White and a Negro is subject to conviction upon proof of the elements comprising the offense it proscribes, we hold s 798.05 invalid as a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . It is readily apparent that s 798.05 treats the interracial couple made up of a White person and a Negro differently than it does any other couple. No couple other than a Negro and a White person can be convicted under s 798.05 and no other section proscribes the precise conduct banned by s 798.05. Florida makes no claim to the contrary in this Court. However, all whites and Negroes who engage in the forbidden conduct are covered by the section and each member of the interracial couple is subject to the same penalty. . . . We deal here with a racial classification embodied in a criminal statute. In this context, where the power of the State weighs most heavily upon the individual or the group, we must be especially sensitive to the policies of the Equal Protection Clause which, as reflected in congressional enactments dating from 1870, were intended to secure “the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property” and to subject all persons “to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” R.S. s 1977, 42 U.S.C. s 1981 (1958 ed.). Our inquiry, therefore, is whether there clearly appears in the relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in by a White person and a Negro, but not otherwise. . It should come as no surprise that Section 798.05 treats the interracial marriage consisting of a White person and a Black person in a different manner than it does any other type of couple. Under section 798.05, the only couple that can be convicted of a crime is one that consists of a Black person and a White person, and no other portion of the code prohibits the same behavior as section 798.05 does. In this court, Florida presents no argument or evidence to the contrary. However, this provision applies to any person of any race who engages in the prohibited behavior, therefore the penalty that applies to one member of an interracial partnership also applies to the other partner in the relationship. . . . In this case, we are dealing with a racial classification that is embedded within a legal statute. In this setting, where the power of the state presses most heavily upon the individual or the group, we need to be especially sensitive to the policies of the Equal Protection Clause. These policies, which can be seen reflected in congressional enactments dating back to 1870, were intended to secure “the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property” and to subject all individuals “to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and nature.” In other words Statutes R.S. 1977 and 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1958 ed.). Our inquiry, therefore, is to determine whether there clearly appears in the relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in by a White person and a Negro, but not when engaged in by anyone else other than those two groups. Without such justification the racial classification contained in s 798.05 is reduced to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. The Florida Supreme Court, relying upon Pace v. Alabama, supra, found no legal discrimination at all and gave no consideration to statutory purpose. The State in its brief in this Court, however, says that the legislative purpose of s 798.05, like the other sections of chapter 798, was to prevent breaches of the basic concepts of sexual decency; and we see no reason to quarrel with the State’s characterization of this statute, dealing as it does with illicit extramarital and premarital promiscuity. We find nothing in this suggested legislative purpose, however, which makes it essential to punish promiscuity of one racial group and not that of another. . . . That a general evil will be partially corrected may at times, and without more, serve to justify the limited application of a criminal law; but legislative discretion to employ the piecemeal approach stops short of permitting a State to narrow statutory coverage to focus on a racial group. Such classifications bear a far heavier burden of justification. ‘When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as an invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U.S. 356,); (State of Missouri ex rel.) Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208.’ Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541… There is involved here an exercise of the state police power which trenches upon the constitutionally protected freedom from invidious official discrimination based on race. Such a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a heavy burden of justification, as we have said, and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy. . . . Florida has offered no argument that the State’s policy against interracial marriage cannot be as adequately served by the general, neutral, and existing ban on illicit behavior as by a provision such as s 798.05 which singles out the promiscuous interracial couple for special statutory treatment. In short, it has not been shown that s 798.05 is a necessary adjunct to the State’s ban on interracial marriage. We accordingly invalidate s 798.05 without expressing any views about the State’s prohibition of interracial marriage, and reverse these convictions.
