SVEDKA Vodka (A)
As he waited for his wife to meet him, Guillaume Cuvelier sat in a downtown Manhattan restaurant
sipping vodka straight up. As founder and managing director of Spirits Marque One, a liquor importer,
Cuvelier wondered if patrons of such an upscale bar would soon be ordering his new vodka by its name:
SVEDKA. It was mid-1998, and the product was set to launch in just a few months. Scanning the bar for the
competition’s vodka bottles, Cuvelier ran through the marketing campaign in his head.1
The U.S. government defined vodka as a neutral spirit “without distinctive character, aroma, taste, or
color.” As one food and beverage writer explained, “Good vodka is considered to be one without the harsh,
rubbing-alcohol fumes of ethanol.”2 The now-popular liquor originated in the 14th century in either Russia or
Poland (depending on which history you believe) as a spirit distilled from rye or wheat. In the early 1800s, the
introduction of filtration and dilution techniques allowed vodka to evolve into something more refined but
no less potent.
As Cuvelier enjoyed his drink, the image of James Bond came to mind—described years earlier by an
industry observer as “the first upscale vodka drinker.”3 Consumers were increasingly imitating Bond’s
discerning taste for high-priced vodka. In this climate, Cuvelier reviewed his own pricing, distribution, and
positioning one last time. He hoped he was right that the vodka market was ready for a midpriced option. He
wondered if there really was an opportunity below the Bond tier and above the very low-priced products.
With a small marketing budget, Cuvelier had to be correct in his efforts to position his brand as he created a
new segment.
On Trend
Trends in the marketplace inspired Cuvelier to take a closer look at opportunities in the spirits business
(whiskey, gin, and vodka were among those classified as spirits). In 1991, he had received his MBA from the
Darden School of Business at the conclusion of a two-year hiatus from his position with LVMH’s Möet
Hennessy-Louis Vuitton.
As an industry insider during the 1980s and early 1990s, Cuvelier had been inspired by Absolut vodka’s
success as a product, brand, and category leader. “Pre-Absolut, you could say that vodka was vodka was
vodka,” he said.
Cuvelier believed there was room to compete in the category by offering his own twist on the concept of
name-brand vodka. With that purpose in mind, in 1998, Cuvelier founded a small entrepreneurial team of
industry experts in New York City. That same year, vodka was the top-selling distilled spirit, representing
24% of total spirits consumption in the United States, up 3.6% in volume sales from 1997. The growth in
premium vodka was in stark contrast to the negative long-term trend for most other spirits. (See Exhibit 1
for vodka sales from 1975 to 1998 and projections for the category.)
The Market
Branded vodka dated back to the late 1860s, when Smirnoff cultivated the endorsement of the czar,
engaged in comparative advertising with competitors, and paid patrons of Moscow bars to demand Smirnoff
and accept no substitutes. Russia’s connection with the category became prominent in the minds of many
consumers. A leading imported vodka from Russia, Stolichnaya, had been introduced to the United States as
recently as 1965. The brand leveraged its Russian image, evoking a strong connection to its origin and
heritage. But “Stoli stumbled after the Soviet downing of Flight 007 in 1982, [which] hurt sales of many
Russian products.”4 Once a Russian import, Smirnoff was eventually produced in the United States and came
to dominate the domestic vodka segment, capturing almost 20% of the market share by 1998. Until the
launch of Absolut, Smirnoff dominated the premium-price vodka segment with a brand name that derived
authenticity from the family’s Russian heritage.
The launch of Absolut in 1979 and its now-famous ad campaign helped the brand attain its pop-culture
status. In 1998, Absolut spent $18 million on advertising.5 Years later, USA Today reported: “Absolut had
pioneered selling distilled spirits on image, persuading consumers to buy prestige in a bottle for $20. But the
new prestige vodkas, at $25 to $200, have become what Absolut was 20 years ago.”6
It took more than a decade for the Dutch Ketel One and American Skyy (then the only domestic vodka
priced above $10) to enter the market. New prestige vodkas available at a high price point did indeed seem to
become what Absolut once was. The Business of Spirits stated that the price for vodka “increased to $30 with
the debut of Grey Goose, Chopin, and Belvedere in the late 1990s. Now, the debut market [was] flooded
with $30 vodkas.”7
The success of Grey Goose proved people would pay $30 for a bottle of vodka; in 1998, its sales
increased 50% from the previous year.8 Cuvelier had watched as “consumers became increasingly aware about
the look, quality, and origin of vodka.” (Exhibit 2 shows the number of new vodkas introduced from 1996 to
1998.)
Smirnoff was not alone in its high-volume sales and market share results. Brands such as Popov,
Gordon’s, McCormick, and Barton (each priced under $10) sold the most cases and enjoyed the largest
shares.9 A significant portion of these sales was for the larger-size plastic bottles.
Cuvelier believed that a midpriced vodka could capture some volume sales from the under-$10 market.
“This standard vodka category had never been expanded to include consumers who were willing to stretch
their wallets a little bit,” he said.
The Product
Vodka could be manufactured inexpensively out of many different raw ingredients and didn’t need to be
aged. Its standard alcohol content was 40% or 80 proof. Because the staple ingredients were relatively cheap,
vodka companies invested in more complex distilling and filtering methods as well as flavor ingredients to
distinguish their brands. Marketing campaigns often highlighted “more exotic backstories” to justify higher
prices and profits.10 Indeed, vodka’s smoothness and thickness could vary from brand to brand. “The burn is
usually associated with inexpensive vodkas,” said Robert Plotkin, founder of BarMedia, a beverage consulting
firm.11
Cuvelier was dedicated to creating a high-quality product that could be distinguished for its soft, silky
drinkability. He selected Lidkoping, Sweden, as the manufacturing site. Cuvelier knew the country had
recently joined the European Union, causing it to deregulate the alcohol monopoly. “My plan was to be the
first to effectively develop and produce 80-proof Swedish vodka immediately after the reopening of the
market,” he explained. “I wanted the vodka to be from Sweden, so I could take advantage of the Absolut
tailwind.”
SVEDKA outsourced its production to large, established industrial facilities. The glass bottles were
imported from Germany, decorated in France, and shipped to the factory in Sweden to be filled with vodka.
The finished product was shipped in cases to the United States.
Wine Enthusiast confirmed the quality of Cuvelier’s product, rating SVEDKA 93 out of 100. Classifying
the vodka as a “Best Buy,” the review said, “We can’t remember using the word ‘complex’ when describing a
vodka before, but this one shows a tightly knit set of characteristics that deserve applause.”12
SVEDKA would initially be available in the standard 750 mL and 1.75 L bottles. Larger and smaller sizes
could be added once the business grew. “This gradual size rollout was common industry practice, especially
for a start-up brand,” Cuvelier said. While many brands were extending their selection to include flavored
vodkas, SVEDKA focused on its core unflavored product for the launch.
The Price
In addition to the option of imitating the premium prices of recent imported vodka successes, there was
the under-$10-per-bottle market, which Cuvelier estimated was approximately 80% of the market volume
(also known as the “standard” vodka segment, it ranged from $5 to $9 for 750 mL). In fact, in 1998, 23
million cases were purchased at retail prices less than $10 per 750 mL bottle (Table 1).13 And then there was
the third opportunity: to be a midtier player between the high and low price spectrums.
Table 1. Vodka category price, units sold, market share, and launch year by brand, 1998.
Brand
Price
(750 mL)
Cases (9 L)
(in thousands)
Market Share
(percentage) Launch Year
Grey Goose $25.00 50 0.2 1997
Ketel One 18.00 450 1.3 1989
Absolut 16.00 3630 10.6 1979
Stolichnaya 16.50 1,100 3.2 1970
Skyy 11.50 702 2.1 1993
Smirnoff 10.00 6,720 19.7 1960
Gordon’s 7.00 2,155 6.3 1960
Popov 6.50 2,230 6.5 1960
Note: Market share calculation is based on total case volume for imported and domestic vodka.
Data sources: Adams Business Media; Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control; case writer estimates.
Exhibit 3 shows the supplier case prices for vodka. In 1998, according to a Standard & Poor’s survey of
the alcohol industry, operating margins for U.S. alcohol beverage companies were about 20%, “well above the
12% to 14% range for packaged food companies.”14
Cuvelier estimated that wholesaler margins for SVEDKA averaged 25%. Retailers’ margins varied from
30% to 35%.
It was industry practice to offer retailers volume discounts. Cuvelier created Table 2 to estimate the
discount levels he would be expected to offer.
Table 2. Estimated discount levels based on case quantity discount.
Discount
Level
Case Quantity
Discount
Estimated
Sales
Savings
to Retailers
1 3 10% 8%
2 5 15% 13%
3 25 75% 19%
Source: SVEDKA.
To reach a final everyday suggested retail bottle price, Cuvelier had to consider the costs along the
wholesale and retail channels. The wholesaler’s net laid-in costs were the sum of the free on board (FOB)
price, the U.S. Federal Excise Tax (FET), state tax, and freight costs. (The FET per proof gallon was $13.50
in 1998.) SVEDKA classified the mandatory FET and individual state taxes (which varied by state) as hard
production costs.
Pricing was tricky, and critics warned Cuvelier that if the price were too low, consumers might think the
vodka was low-quality. But if SVEDKA were priced too high, consumers might question its value. A
midrange price would risk SVEDKA’s getting lost among the more premium brands. Already, higher-priced
brands were encountering competition from the superpremium competitors. In The Business of Spirits, author
Noah Rothbaum commented on the dilemma SVEDKA faced: “Many companies with high-priced spirits are
concerned that their products soon will be leapfrogged by other, even more expensive brands, stealing their
attention and market share.”15
Target Customer
Despite the risks he identified, Cuvelier was optimistic. “I believe that SVEDKA is the only brand in the
vodka category to bridge the two ends of the category, appealing to both upgraders and consumers looking
for the best possible value,” he said. “I see SVEDKA as being at the crossroads of the market.” SVEDKA
wanted to capture the new vodka drinkers as the category was expanding, along with the “upgraders” who
were looking for an opportunity to drink something better than the standard offerings. SVEDKA could be
the vodka of choice for both price-driven groups.
In addition to considering consumer price sensitivity, Cuvelier segmented vodka drinkers into two large
groups based on age and consumption behavior. Regular vodka drinkers tended to be price-conscious and
loyal to a brand; consumers in this first segment were mostly older males. The second group consisted of the
21-to-35-year-old consumer, who represented 40% of the vodka market. (Exhibit 4 shows the breakdown of
distilled spirits drinkers by category and age group.) Cuvelier thought this target group was also priceconscious, but not so brand-loyal. He was confident that SVEDKA, if positioned properly, would be able to
tap into this younger crowd.
Distribution
Off-premise (or off-trade) channels were the liquor and retail stores, while on-premise (or on-trade)
channels included bars, hotels, and restaurants. Brands were usually launched simultaneously in both the ontrade locations and retail outlets. The on-premise percentage of volume was higher for premium brands
because consumers often ordered drinks mixed with a specified brand-name vodka. For example, in 2003,
51% of Ketel One’s volume was from on-premise. The percentages of on-premise consumption for Grey
Goose, Absolut, and Stoli were 48%, 38%, and 37%, respectively.16
The spirits industry was a highly regulated business. Producers and importers could not sell directly to the
retailers; instead, they were required to sell to licensed liquor wholesalers, who then serviced retailers.
Licenses were issued by the state and therefore restricted wholesaler distributors from operating beyond any
given state’s jurisdiction. Cuvelier relied on a small internal sales team to manage the distributors as key
clients. By leveraging relationships within the industry, “I tried to overcome the biggest hurdle of getting
distributors on board,” he said.
Another obstacle in distributing liquor was the issue of control states (also known as monopolies). In 18
U.S. states, accounting for about 25% of the population, state governments exercised monopoly control over
the wholesaling and/or retailing of alcohol (Exhibits 5 and 6). These states, among them North Carolina,
Vermont, and Washington, were scattered across the country. Michigan, Pennsylvania, Washington, and
Virginia were not only control states but also ranked among the top 15 states for retail spending on distilled
spirits.17 Most control states had higher taxes and prices than noncontrol states. For marketers, obtaining
distribution meant persuading each independent state liquor commission to carry their brands.
In all cases, pricing was uniform and dictated by the state, leaving very little room for promoting brands.
In most control states, retail prices were much higher than those in “open” neighbor states, but there were a
few notable exceptions, such as New Hampshire and Pennsylvania. Temporary discounts and displays were
allowed but highly regulated (and each state has its own set of rules) and needed to go through a lengthy
approval process with the local liquor board. Shelf positioning was not negotiable. Another limitation in
control states was the lack of convenience: Many had an insufficient number of stores, often with poor
locations and limited operating hours.
Off-premise retailers were divided into food, drug, and liquor stores. Food stores included groceries,
delis, and larger wholesale clubs. Drugstores such as Walgreens comprised the drug category. Liquor stores
were further divided into the independent and control-state-owned liquor stores. Cuvelier estimated that the
breakdown was 35%, 20%, and 45% for food, drug, and liquor stores, respectively. “The big chains, across all
categories, were harder to penetrate, since they required high margins and heavy marketing support and
established market share,” he explained. “These bigger outlets relied on strong consumer pull for top
brands.”
For vodka, independent retailers were responsible for significant volume sales. And they could give the
brand strong and sustained support because they generated higher margins on SVEDKA than high-volume
established brands while offering a very competitive price. The pricing of SVEDKA, Cuvelier thought, would
be attractive to them—which translated into eye-level shelf positioning, floor displays, and spontaneous
retailers’ recommendations. By prominently displaying SVEDKA alongside key competitors, store owners
could give the brand invaluable credibility. And so SVEDKA planned to concentrate sales efforts on these
midmarket retail outlets. In particular, Cuvelier intended to focus on landing the family-owned operations,
considered midtier stores in terms of traffic and business, and devote very little effort to the chain stores such
as large grocery and drug chains that also sold liquor in noncontrol states.
The distribution strategy for SVEDKA required a network of wholesalers and brokers. Cuvelier thought
it would be difficult to gain a foothold among large wholesalers in the biggest states, so he looked for what he
called “challenger” distributors where he could get more attention and support from management and sales.
These operated primarily in open states. (See Exhibit 5 for retail sales of vodka in the top 25 states by retail
sales in 1998.) Robust collateral pieces explaining the benefits of the product, brand, and company were given
to all retailers as education materials.
Cuvelier believed that, given his limited budget, launching SVEDKA in the midmarket off-premise
locations was the most effective strategy. He instructed his sales force to secure distribution in liquor stores
only. But he still harbored doubts about which particular states he should select and the order in which they
would receive SVEDKA shipments.
The Brand
The first association consumers would have with the product was its name. Cuvelier had searched for a
word that evoked the vodka’s Swedish heritage. During his many trips to Sweden, the word Svensk
(“Swedish”) caught his attention; it appeared everywhere. He combined it with the word “vodka” to come up
with an easier-to-pronounce version: SVEDKA. Although focus groups and the packaging agency didn’t
confirm the wisdom of his choice, Cuvelier stayed with his intuition. (Exhibit 7 shows the SVEDKA bottle
with its original logo, which has since been updated.)
The name was fitting for the product’s positioning. Cuvelier envisioned SVEDKA as a challenger brand,
with a personality like JetBlue in the airline industry or Target in fashion: an inexpensive, chic alternative. It
was a fun option that challenged the status quo in a category that was taking itself too seriously. SVEDKA
empowered the consumer with a different choice where there wasn’t much discrepancy among the products
in its category. “The category is locked in sameness,” Cuvelier said. “Each brand relies on a stated marketing
recipe of bottle shot plus product benefit plus cocktail recipe plus historical reference.18
The Campaign
Cuvelier estimated he had about $350,000 to spend in his first year on marketing SVEDKA (not
including promotions to wholesalers and retailers, which could include the discount levels, support materials,
sales force incentives, and in-store promotions). He allocated this budget among media, point of sale (POS),
trade shows, creative, and sampling.
Until distribution reached key markets, Cuvelier did not use traditional advertising. Generally, brands
were promoted in print (with magazines as the dominant medium), outdoor, broadcast, and electronic media
at an increase of 14% over the $256 million spent in 1997.19 (Refer to Exhibit 8 for the total advertising
expenditure in 1997 and 1998.) Cuvelier wanted SVEDKA to achieve distribution, brand awareness, and
word of mouth before he launched a national campaign. He was left to reassess the best use of his dollars
across the following marketing methods.
Trade press and PR
Cuvelier viewed trade relationships as the first step in communicating about his brand. There were a
small but influential group of trade magazines and writers he needed to acquaint with SVEDKA. He bought a
few full-page trade ads and entered SVEDKA in vodka contests to drum up press. He succeeded with the
Wine Enthusiast 93 rating. Such high marks were in line with the more expensive Grey Goose (which received
a 94) and Ketel One (93) and higher than the ratings for Stolichnaya (91), Skyy (90), Belvedere (89), and
Absolut (90).20 The favorable results validated the brand in the eyes of the wholesalers. Their excitement
about SVEDKA would determine how quickly it was embraced by the largest, bottom portion, the core
consumer. All media outreach was limited to the trade outlets. SVEDKA used its high-profile reviews to fuel
favorable trade press articles. But additional public relations efforts toward larger publications were not
scheduled for the launch.
Point of sale
Brand visibility would be at the store level through POS materials. Because of the emphasis on an offpremise distribution strategy, Cuvelier allocated marketing dollars toward enhancing the in-store experience
(midtier liquor stores). POS and store signage (shelf, display, and window materials) helped bring the brand to
life at the point of decision making and purchasing. The Wine Enthusiast ranking was displayed on POS pieces
to provide the unknown product with credibility.
Trade shows
SVEDKA planned to sponsor booths at top industry trade shows. Attendees at these shows included
wholesalers and retailers, as well as the media and competition. Although trade shows were costly and time-
consuming, Cuvelier believed that having a presence at industry events would develop brand recognition as
well as provide continuing insight into industry trends.
Creative
The collateral materials that supported the SVEDKA booth at trade shows, in addition to the POS
materials and trade press kits, fell under the creative investment line item. Cuvelier wanted all branding
elements to have a cohesive look and feel for both internal and external audiences. The same images appeared
as limited ads in trade magazines such as Beverage Industry News.
Sampling
And finally, when the product was to be introduced in a new store, SVEDKA intended to host sampling
events. SVEDKA wanted to put its own twist on the customer-engagement tactic by designing customized,
branded barware test tubes. Cuvelier was certain that the ROI on these 1,000 to 1,500 sampling events per
year (two to three hours per event with a small staff and collateral materials) was enormous. SVEDKA had
only one shot at the launch campaign, and Cuvelier was confident in his tactics. But he did find himself
reexamining his budget in the final days before his product’s debut.
Exhibit 1
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
Projections: Vodka versus Total Distilled Spirits
(in thousands of 9 L cases)
Vodka Total Distilled Spirits
Year Cases ACGR* Cases ACGR
1975 31,898 -.-% 179,731 -.-%
1980 36,411 2.7 190,903 1.2
1985 35,681 –0.4 173,508 –1.9
1986 34,717 –2.7 164,531 –5.2
1987 33,626 –3.1 162,024 –1.5
1988 34,712 3.2 159,008 –1.9
1989 35,054 1.0 155,865 –2.0
1990 35,362 0.9 159,190 2.1
1991 33,397 –5.6 147,026 –7.6
1992 32,964 –1.3 148,015 0.7
1993 32,441 –1.6 144,162 –2.6
1994 31,910 –1.6 139,996 –2.9
1995 32,175 0.8 137,330 –1.9
1996 33,002 2.6 138,814 1.1
1997 32,912 –0.3 138,740 –0.1
1998 34,088 3.6 140,568 1.3
1999 projected versus 1998 35,000 2.7 141,905 1.0
2003 projected versus 1998 35,500 0.8 143,240 0.4
*Annual compound growth rate.
Data source: Adams Liquor Handbook 1999.
Exhibit 1 (continued)
Vodka Sales, 1993 to 1998 (in millions of 9 L cases)
Standard Vodka
Premium Vodka
Source: SVEDKA sales presentation, 2001.
Exhibit 2
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
New Distilled Spirits Introductions by Category, 1996–98
Number of Introductions Share of Total
Category 1996 1997 1998 Category 1996 1997 1998
U.S. whiskey
Canadian
Scotch
Irish
Total whiskey
10
7
39
2
58
14
1
18
2
35
19
5
42
4
70
U.S. whiskey
Canadian
Scotch
Irish
Total whiskey
3.9%
2.7
15.3
0.8
22.7%
6.1%
0.4
7.8
0.9
15.2%
5.1%
1.3
11.3
1.1
18.9%
Gin
Vodka
Rum
Tequila
Brandy and cognac
Cordials and liqueurs
Prepared cocktails
Neutral spirits
Total nonwhiskey
11
37
31
19
29
44
26
– –
197
5
24
26
24
44
50
20
2
195
10
23
27
46
104
72
18
1
301
Gin
Vodka
Rum
Tequila
Brandy and cognac
Cordials and liqueurs
Prepared cocktails
Neutral spirits
Total nonwhiskey
4.3
14.5
12.2
7.5
11.4
17.3
10.2
-.-
77.3%
2.2
10.4
11.3
10.4
19.1
21.7
8.7
0.9
84.8%
2.7
6.2
7.3
12.4
28.0
19.4
4.9
0.3
81.1%
Total 255 230 371 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Data source: Adams Liquor Handbook 1999, 5.
Exhibit 3
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
Supplier Vodka Case Prices
Price Ranges Percentage
Under $34.99 16.5
$35.00 to $39.99 21.4
$40.00 to $49.99 18.8
$50.00 to $59.99 22.1
$60.00 to $99.99 2.8
$100.00 to $119.99 18.3
Total 100.0
Data source: Adams Liquor Handbook 1999, 135.
Exhibit 4
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
Consumers of Distilled Spirits by Category and Age Group
(in percent)
Age Groups Total
Category 21–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Adults
Distilled spirits 62.7 60.6 55.2 53.1 44.4 35.2 51.7
Bourbon 15.2 13.6 12.8 12.3 12.6 9.5 12.5
Blend/rye 3.7 6.3 6.0 6.6 7.3 5.9 6.2
Canadian 6.9 10.0 11.6 11.3 13.3 9.1 10.7
Scotch 6.7 8.3 9.0 12.9 11.4 8.8 9.7
Irish 3.5 3.0 3.7 4.5 3.0 2.3 3.3
Gin 16.5 15.3 15.0 16.4 13.7 10.4 14.5
Vodka 30.4 29.6 25.5 24.5 21.8 15.4 24.3
Rum 34.4 28.2 26.0 23.1 15.8 7.9 22.1
Tequila 26.7 24.9 20.1 17.9 9.5 5.1 17.2
Brandy and cognac 4.1 7.3 8.3 11.0 8.8 7.7 8.2
Cordials and liqueurs 27.3 21.6 21.6 21.9 19.0 11.6 20.0
Adult population
(in millions) 12.3 38.9 43.1 34.4 22.1 31.9 182.7
Note: Includes consumers age 21 and older only.
Data sources: Simmons Market Research Bureau, Spring 1998 Study of Media and Markets; Adams Liquor Handbook 1999, 291.
Exhibit 5
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
Retail Sales for Vodka in Top 25 States, 1998
($$ in millions)
Rank State Sales
Control
or Open
Percent Share of
All Distilled Spirits
1 California $738 Open 10.40
2 Florida $517 Open 6.50
3 New York $468 Open 7.40
4 Illinois $341 Open 5.00
5 Texas $333 Open 5.80
6 New Jersey $317 Open 3.90
7 Pennsylvania $307 Control 3.70
8 Michigan $296 Control 3.70
9 Ohio $221 Control 3.50
10 Georgia $203 Open 2.80
11 Washington $198 Control 2.50
12 Wisconsin $190 Open 2.80
13 Connecticut $179 Open 1.90
14 Massachusetts $177 Open 3.20
15 South Carolina $149 Open 1.70
16 Arizona $147 Open 1.80
17 North Carolina $146 Control 2.00
18 Minnesota $144 Open 2.10
19 Maryland $140 Open 2.00
20 Colorado $139 Open 1.90
21 Virginia $133 Control 2.00
22 Indiana $127 Open 1.90
23 Tennessee $117 Open 1.40
24 Missouri $113 Open 1.80
25 Louisiana $102 Open 1.70
Top 25 $5,942 84.00
Bottom 25 $1,280 16.50
Total United States $7,222 21.20
Control Open
Top 25 6 19
Total United States 18 32
Top 25 vodka sales, in millions $1,301 $4,641
Top 25 percent share 22 78
Data source: Adams Liquor Handbook 1999, 34.
Exhibit 6
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
Map of Control (Dark) and Open (Light) States
Data source: “US States by Alcohol Control,” posted to public domain under Creative Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0) by
“Demi,” November 8, 2006, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US_States_by_alcohol_control.svg (accessed May 22,
2009).
Exhibit 7
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
SVEDKA Bottle with Original Logo
Source: SVEKDA.
Exhibit 8
SVEDKA Vodka (A)
Total Advertising Expenditures for Vodka, 1997–98
($$ in thousands)
1997 1998
Brand Mag. News. Outdoor B’cast Total Mag. News. Outdoor B’cast Total
Absolut
Smirnoff
Finlandia
Stolichnaya
Skyy
Belvedere
Grey Goose
Chopin
Argent
Taaka
Georgi
Fleischmann’s
Vodka
Gordon’s Vodka
Stolichnaya
Cristall
Rain Vodka
Iceberg
McCormick
Vodka
Tanqueray
Sterling
Wyborowa
Kremlyovskaya
$27,013.9
12,363.3
2,412.2
7,662.9
3,816.8
116.2
—
60.3
—
—
—
—
2,471.8
—
—
—
—
2,007.8
—
30.9
$201.7
80.0
0.4
182.4
—
—
—
—
—
—
156.7
—
—
—
—
35.6
—
—
115.0
—
$515.7
866.3
1.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
237.0
—
137.5
—
—
—
—
107.5
299.1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
$27,731.3
13,309.6
2,414.4
7,845.3
3,816.8
116.2
—
69.3
—
237.0
156.7
137.5
2,471.8
—
—
35.6
107.5
2,306.9
115.0
30.9
$27,617.0
14,558.1
8,156.4
6,799.6
3,259.7
518.1
—
274.9
58.2
—
—
—
105.8
82.1
30.0
27.3
—
—
—
—
$308.2
391.3
90.2
173.0
—
863.3
547.4
242.1
236.2
—
177.3
—
—
14.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
$1,420.4
856.2
575.6
—
224.1
—
—
—
—
286.1
—
167.4
—
—
—
—
7.9
—
—
—
$161.9
18.2
325.9
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
$29,507.5
15,822.8
9,148.1
6,972.6
3,483.8
1,381.4
547.4
517.0
294.4
286.1
177.3
167.4
105.8
96.9
30.0
27.3
7.9
—
—
—
Total
expenditure $57,965.1 $771.8 $2,164.9 — $60,901.8 $61,487.2 $3,043.8 $3,537.7 $506.0 $68,574.7
Data sources: Competitive Media; Adams Liquor Handbook 1999, 136.
