“A Critical Assessment of Human Element Regarding Maritime Safety:
Issues of Planning, Policy and Practice”

Abstract
In this paper, we will present the findings, derived from a structured questionnaire,
that cover various aspects of the relation between human factor and maritime safety.
In general, human element holds a very important share compared to the ensemble of
marine-accident causes. This fact renders human behaviour and performance as
potential leading components in relative safety surveys. Moreover, it must be noted
that marine industry is surely between the less documented sectors, as far as human
element is concerned. Nevertheless, IMO is constantly aiming at an adequate
incorporation of human factor in numerous of its actions and regulations. Hence,
numerous key enhancements of human behaviour and performance could be regarded
as possible future standards and specifications, for certain safety-driven procedures of
maritime transport. Then, we describe and analyse an original human-related
questionnaire, which focuses on depicting the current practice of human factor,
mainly through the implementation of the International Safety Management Code.
The specific questionnaire, which comprises of an adequate sample of interviews and
surveys, is presented in detail, in order to set off all fields of included data and its
corresponding potential for informative and exploitative usage. Thus, the selected
results are clearly human-oriented and they assay to portray a number of human
aspects (crew training, acceptance etc), relatively to safe management and naval
accidents. Finally, we close this paper with some interesting and revealing
conclusions, derived from the aforementioned process. This way, we plan to show the
importance of human factor in the evolving outline of the contemporary marine
industry.
Keywords: human factor, marine safety, International Safety Management, accidents.
Introduction
The issue of marine safety should be regarded as the key priority concerning the
planning and practice of maritime transport procedures, in a worldwide scale. Since
the vast majority of world trade is being conducted through sea-borne ways, maritime
safety should be viewed as a factor that needs extreme caution, detailed planning,
self-commitment and obligatory enforcement. The term marine safety has a multi-fold
content, with a serious impact on numerous aspects of the maritime transport chain;
more specifically, it involves the aversion of human losses and injuries, the
preservation of marine and coastal environment and the protection of vessels and their
cargoes. Hence, safety topics are not to be simply pinpointed and addressed in the
aftermath of a significant, or a mass media-adduced, naval accident. On the contrary,
these matters should be dealt proactively, in order to provide for an efficient, profit
making and environment-friendly maritime transport network.
There are several causes that can rupture the aforementioned transport chain, with
undesired consequences. This can be resulted from unsolved mechanical or electrical
problems, hazardous external conditions (such as severe weather), poor human factor
behaviour or performance (e.g. inadequate bridge resource management), accidental
events (like an unpredictable hull problem) etc. However, it is a fact that human
element is the basic and by far the most frequent reason that leads towards marine
accidents (Ventikos, 2002). Each involved player (e.g. crew, shore management,
classification societies etc) has been recorded as the responsible component for
numerous verified mishaps, which could have been averted under different
circumstances. Thus, the correct way to respond to casualties and exploit its
knowledge potential is to analyse the “mistakes” (mainly human errors) that caused
them and assay to prevent them from appearing ever again.
The corresponding literature contains several examples than can depict the
significance of human factor in relation to safe maritime management, even from a
high level point-of-view. The case of the collision between the passenger vessel
Noordam and the loaded bulk carrier Mount Ymitos could be considered as a typical
example of documenting the involvement of human element in marine accidents
(Atkinson, 1995). This accident happened near the Southeast Pass in the Gulf of
Mexico, and both vessels were moderately damaged. The human errors that were
pinpointed by the corresponding investigation were, the failure of officers on the
Noordam to maintain a vigilant watch, the preoccupation of Noordam bridge crew
with arrival activities and a certain lack of communication betwixt the two ships.
Another similar example is the collision between the supply vessel Galveston and the
Panamanian bulk carrier Atticos in the Lower Mississippi River near Venice,
Louisiana (Atkinson, 1995). This accident resulted into the rapid sinking of Galveston
and the loss of three of its crewmembers. The detected human errors were the failure
of the Galveston crew to maintain a proper lookout (either visually or by radar), the
insufficient time to adapt to the darkness and the failure to establish a proper passing
agreement.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed prominent activities
(guidelines, circulars etc) concerning the combination of human factor with safe
navigation and management issues. Its focus is primarily on manning, qualification
and licensing (STCW 95); safety procedures (ISM, which is the chosen vehicle of this
paper); automation design (integrated bridges, human-machine interfaces (HMI), etc);
communications; organizational practices and structures. All the above, target to the
amelioration of human interference, in the context of an enhanced and more safe
maritime transport framework.
The structure of this paper is as follows: the next section includes some findings
concerning the involvement of human element in marine accidents. The following one
gives a current view on IMO’s actions and guidelines regarded human factor and
safety. Thereupon, the introduced questionnaire on human aspects – regarding marine
safety and management – is presented in adequate detail. The penultimate section
gives some original and revealing results coming from the analysis of the
questionnaire feedback and the last one closes the paper with insights and conclusions
on various points of the aforementioned topics.
Human Element Statistics Regarding Marine Safety
The effort of allocating various forms of human error as verified accident causes is
surely not a trivial task. Moreover, this difficulty is augmented in the case of maritime
transport, since the respective monitoring and documentation is usually lacking of
adequacy and excellence. Nonetheless, marine industry can be exemplified from other
sectors of industry (e.g. civil aviation, nuclear plants etc), where considerable load of
attention is already given in pinpointing and revealing various involved aspects of
human element. Accident investigators in these industries do not simply cover the
chronic events of an accident from a high-level point of analysis, but they actually try
to efficiently incorporate in each methodology framework, the human factor in all of
its subsequent forms. In this manner, risk assessment acquires solid and complete
settings that can ascertain for realistic and useful results. The following short list gives
some of the human-driven causes implemented for airborne accidents (ICAO, 1987):
· Failed to obtain/maintain flying speed, follow approved procedures, directives;
· Unsuitable selected area for take-off, landing, taxing;
· Inadequate pre-flight preparation etc;
Therefore, human behaviour and performance can be the prevailing factors that
prescribe the level of safety for numerous maritime transport procedures and practices
of management. This means that they can also influence, in a considerable degree, the
protection of marine and coastal environment. Thus, a feasible way to reduce the
frequency and severity of naval accidents is, by identifying the contributing factors to
the so-called human error, and by investigating for methods, which will either
eliminate or mitigate these mistakes.
Figure 1: Analysis by Category of Casualty, 1977-1991 (Tankers, 6000+ GRT).
Wrecked/Stranded
F/E Pump-room
F/E Other
F/E Machinery
F/E Cargo
Machinery Damage
Hull Damage
Foundered Other
Fire/Explosion
Contact/Collision
Original Source: Lloyd’s Register, 1992
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of tanker casualties per accident category, for the
time period 1977-1991 (IMO, 1992). It is evident that mishaps such as
Fire/Explosions, Contact/Collisions and Groundings, are mainly responsible for the
recorded tanker casualties. However, this analysis is in no position to reveal the actual
causes that led to the aforementioned accidents and to come up with conclusions
concerning the active involvement of human factor. This crucial weakness can be
remedied with the dynamic incorporation of human element in the process at play.
Hence, both human errors and error producing conditions can be assessed formulating
a realistic approach to the actual event chain that constitute each incident.
A preliminary survey concerning the combination of human element and naval
accidents is shown in Table 1. It must be noted that the implemented data are derived
from the Transportation Safety Board (TSB), and they cover multiple vessel type
casualties, for the time-period 1981-1992.
Table 1: Analysis of Causes (including HE) for Marine Accidents (1981-1992).
Cause % Contributing Cause %
Outer Conditions 4
Port/Harbour 2
Navigational
Reasons/Aids
1
Other (Vessel) 3
Vessel “Hardware” 16
Misjudgement (Captain) 11
Misjudgement (Pilot) 34
Communication Problems 10
Misunderstanding 9
Attention Problems (Pilot &
Officers)
23
Human Element 74
Other Human Errors 13
Table 1 gives human element as the major cause for sea accidents, with a percentage
of 74%. Therewithal, the problems of misjudgement (45%) and lack of attention
(23%) are presented to be the most important ones from human factor point-of-view.
The term “hardware” refers to vessels hull, main engine etc.
In general, human error is considered to be the preponderant cause for the majority of
naval accidents. Relative studies come up with percentages from 70% to 95% (with an
average value of about 80%) for accidents in the maritime transport chain. Crew costs
correspond to about 10% of the total running costs (Welling, 1995). However, it this
specific ship-cost category that is usually pressed down, in order to “balance”
economically each vessel. This can be interpreted into e.g. cheaper labour, smaller
crews, inadequate training; all these are constituents that enhance the probability for
marine accidents.
Closing this section, Cpt. Ken Fullwood’s words are mentioned: “The well known
80% of all marine casualties are caused by human error, is flat wrong. I believe
human error – or poor judgement, which is the same thing – is a factor in 100% of
accidents, or very close to it”.
Current IMO Perceptions on Human Element: Visions & Guidelines
As already mentioned, in the majority of maritime transport accidents, human
behaviour and performance were the key factors that led to their beginning, escalation
and conclusion. This means that the lack of various human-related aspects can and
actually did play a burdensome role, regarding the various phases of a hazardous
incident (Karydis & Vasilakos, 2000). Thus, it is imperative that all involved players
should deal efficiently with the specific problem, aiming at the mitigation – if not at
the prevention – of circumstances that foster the occurrence of accidents.
Nevertheless, IMO – many times in cooperation with other units, e.g. the International
Labour Organization (ILO) – tries to formulate an operational and legal framework, to
find solutions covering the manifestation of human element, in management issues
and accidents that threaten either the ship, the cargo, human life or the marine
environment. This denotes that IMO implements various state-of-the-art techniques,
aiming at an enhanced survey on human element; some of these efforts are
sententiously and indicatively presented below.
International Safety Management (ISM) Code: this is the international management
code for the safe operation of vessels and for pollution prevention, which was adopted
by IMO with resolution A.741(18) (IMO, 2001). Table 2 shows the ratified time
schedule for the ISM Code. This effort scopes to apply structured human-oriented
procedures (e.g. in management, documentation, training etc), in order to achieve
enhanced safety for international shipping and alleviate consequent injuries, life
losses and damages to the environment. So this Code poses human factor in the center
of safety operations assigning to it what IMO refers to as “safety culture”: a selfwilling commitment for every individual to contribute in “safer shipping and cleaner
oceans”. This paper mainly utilizes the findings from the implementation of this
Code, as the proper vehicle to pinpoint and analyse various human-driven aspects, in
relation to marine safety.
Table 2: Ratified Time Schedule for the ISM Code.
Vessel Type Date
Passenger Ships (incl. High-Speed Crafts) 1 July 1998
Oil & Chemical Tankers, Gas & Bulk Carriers, Cargo
High-Speed Crafts (all above 500 GRT) 1 July 1998
Other Cargo Vessels, Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
(all above 500 GRT) 1 July 2002
Seafarers Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code: this was adopted
on 7 July 1995, entered into force on 1 February 1997 and it constitutes the
attachment No 2 to the Final Act of the Conference of Parties to the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
(IMO, 1996). This Code comprises of 2 parts:
Part A. It is the mandatory part of the Code that describes the minimum standards
that fulfil the provisions of the STCW Convention.
Part B. It the recommended part/guide targeting to the unimpeded enforcement of
the STCW Convention.
STCW addresses the issue of crew competence. Hence, it handles matters of fatigue,
training, survival functions, occupational safety, watchkeeping etc – e.g. Chapter VIII,
Section A-VIII/1, Fitness for duty, Chapter VI, Section A-VI/3, Mandatory minimum
training in advanced fire fighting etc. Furthermore, STCW provides for certain
characteristics/qualifications for the corresponding assessors – e.g. Chapter I, Section
B-I/6, Guidance regarding training and assessment etc. It must be noted, that the
STCW Convention does not deal with manning levels; Chapter V, Regulation 14, of
the new International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), covers this
topic along with resolution A.890(21), adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1999.
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) & Human Reliability Analysis (HRA): IMO has
introduced FSA, which is “… a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at
enhancing maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine
environment and property by using risk and cost/benefit assessments” (IMO, 2000).
Under this perspective, the human element can be incorporated in the specific process
by implementing HRA, mainly in Step 1 (Identification of Hazards), Step 2 (Risk
Assessment) and Step 3 (Risk Control Options) of FSA. More specifically, HRA
consists of the following stages (IMO, 2000):
1. Identification of key tasks;
2. Task analysis of key tasks;
3. Human error identification;
4. Human error analysis;
5. Human reliability quantification.
Hence, IMO proposes to quantify the relative contribution of human factor, in order to
evaluate its realistic value concerning mainly the escalation of marine accidents.
Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for IMO: in November 1997, resolution
A.850(20) was adopted regarding human factor matters; this resolution is focused on
human-driven activities concerning the safe operation and management of
commercial ships, and the adequate protection of coastal and marine environment.
The endmost vision of this effort, is to improve the performance and behaviour of
human element, whereas at the same time it is aiming at simpler regulations, better
dissemination of relative information, effective remedial actions, involvement of the
entire operational spectrum (e.g. shore personnel, crew, shipowners etc), enhanced
training, better working conditions etc. Inter alia, resolution A.850(20) attempts to
record and handle issues capable to denote numerous Performance Shaping Factors
(PSFs), which are parameters that can have either negative or positive effect on
human behaviour/ascription; these factors may be experience, situational stress, HMI
etc (IACS, 2002). In particular, HMI cover a very promising and significant area,
which can ameliorate human behaviour, especially in cases of navigational problems
and mishaps (also vide ISO 13407, Human Centred Design Specification).
Human-Related Questionnaire: Introduction & Presentation
The presented questionnaire was initially deve loped and utilised, in order to evaluate
potential trends, perspectives and difficulties faced by companies – that is mainly
from a human factor point-of-view – when implementing the ISM Code (IMO, 1994).
The first phase of ISM implementation, as already known, started in July 1998 and it
was the milestone for all companies, dedicated to transport dangerous goods, bulks
and passengers. After 4 years of continuous updating of the questionnaire database,
the gathered data were considered adequate enough, primarily to evaluate the success
of this IMO instrument, in improving operations within companies. At this point it
must be noted, that the working sample size comprises of about 100 company/ship
questionnaires; this can be translated personnel-wise, into a rather rich sample,
coming e.g. from crewmembers of tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo vessels,
RoRos etc (mainly selected with port state control criteria). Hence, it is able to draw a
general picture concerning the resultant improvement in maritime safety and the
consequent reduction of marine pollution. The interest in the ISM Code and its
achievements (including human factor, administration and marine safety
amelioration) is justified, because of the deep concern of the maritime community on
safety and management measures and policies.
Prior to the detailed presentation of the aforementioned questionnaire and the
subsequent analysis of its results, this paper describes sententiously the definition, the
objectives and the provisions of the ISM Code.
Thus, the ISM Code is an international management code for “…the safe operation of
ships and for pollution prevention” as adopted by IMO through an amendment to the
SOLAS Convention, Chapter IX (IMO, 1997).
Within this context, every ship owner should establish a safety (and environmentfriendly) policy that describes how the various safety-management objectives of each
company will be achieved. Additionally, this management manual should be approved
by the selected Administration. The adopted policy should ensure the compliance with
mandatory rules and regulations, guidelines and standards recommended by IMO,
national administrations, classification societies, shipping community etc. Under these
premises, every company should develop, implement and maintain a safetymanagement system (SMS), which should include proper directives/guidelines, in
order to ensure adequate administration, safe operation for ships and satisfactory
protection of marine and coastal environment. In few words, such a scheme should
comprise the following actions:
· Provide for safe practice in ship operations and for a safe working environment;
· Establish numerous safeguards against all identified risks;
· Continuously improve safety-management skills of personnel ashore and on-board
ships, including awareness for emergency situations (including safety and
environmental hazards).
The company must show to the Administration – or to any other authorised
organisation responsible to assess compliance with the Code – that all of its policies
and procedures are being implemented in a practical and harmonized way. Only then,
the Administration can and will issue the Document of Compliance (DOC – for the
company) and the Safety Management Certificate (SMC – for the vessel). Since July
2002, all shipping companies are obliged to have SMSs in place, aiming at safe
vessels and clean seas.
Continuing with the presented questionnaire, it must be noted, that it was initially
submitted – for approval – to the members/participants of the European Thematic
Network, THEMES. More specifically, Spanish, Portuguese and French partners sent
the inceptive draft to a few selected shipping companies for testing purposes. After
receiving and evaluating the feedback information, the final version was approved and
eventually sent out to a wider sample of companies all over Europe.
The structured questionnaire comprises of five major parts (Martínez de Osés et al,
2001):
Part A. Company identification data;
Part B. Management;
Part C. External input;
Part D. People;
Part E. Possible results from adopting the “safety culture”.
More specifically, part A was intended to obtain information on each interviewed
company, in order to set its input in the proper context; e.g. concerning the kind of the
selected company, if it is a ship-owning or a ship-managing one, the kind of ships
operated and the existing date of certification, indicating the quality and standards of
the utilized certifying organisation. Some of the most representative questions
included in part A, are presented below:
· It is your company primarily a: Shipowner, ship manager or ship manning?
· Which type of vessels does your company operate?
· What is the number of vessels of your fleet?
· Was your company certified by: Directly by the Maritime Administration,
Classification Society or other?
The second question was addressed, in order to focus on the type of traffic that the
interviewed company was involved into, and then to quickly identify if the company
was obliged to develop and maintain a SMS, at the specific date (prior to July 2002).
The third one was included in the context of classifying the company by its own size
and the last question was embodied in the questionnaire, so as to receive more
qualitative and exploitable information, as far as the company certification status is
concerned.
Part B was developed to identify the trends and prospects “behind” the
implementation of the ISM Code. It assays to shed some light on whether the
companies have adopted the guidelines of ISM Code forced from the fact that it was
made compulsory, or because it fitted into the company strategy and would have been
implemented, irrespective of the circumstances. Part B also intended to find out
whether the company was already ISO certified, at the time of the ISM Code
implementation.
One of the key questions of part B is whether “ISM implementation process led to
changes into the company policies”. At this point it must be noted, that a significant
number of answers to the questionnaire, were obtained from oil-related companies,
e.g. D’Amato di Navigazione, Naftomar etc. Therefore, a critical mass of the
incoming answers indicated that the implementation of ISM was not equivalent to a
new line of responsibility. On the contrary, it led more towards a structured
reinforcement of their safety measures and to an upgraded concern for the
responsibilities inherent in every rank and functions of the shore staff and vessel crew.
Another set of questions made in the context of part B, was in reference to quality
systems, such as the following one:
· Is your company also certified according to ISO standards (e.g. ISO 9000)?
The intention for the above question was to know how many respondents wanted to
take advantage from the compulsory application of the ISM Code and with some extra
effort from their part, to acquire a certification in quality, in order to improve the
commercial image of their company.
Part C of the questionnaire, aimed at obtaining information regarding the support
provided from the Flag States during development, implementation, testing, auditing
and certification, as far as the application of the ISM Code, and the corresponding
human element compliance are concerned. Questions posed in this part were in the
line of:
· Have the Flag States, where your vessels are registered, communicated any initial
certification ‘threshold’?
· Have the Flag States, where your vessels are registered, supported and
encouraged the improvement of safety management skills?
The recorded answers to this part of the questionnaire were expected to depend
mostly on the “quality” of the Flag State, in which the ship was regularly flagged.
Indeed, in the case of traditional maritime nations (e.g. UK, Greece etc), the state was
supporting the implementation of the ISM Code, with the occasional aid from
classification societies; whereas for flags of convenience (e.g. Honduras, Bahamas
etc), it was the classification societies, the endorsed and authorised vehicle to carry
out the necessary processes.
Part D intended to obtain information on the levels and practices of training, both for
shore and sea personnel; it should be noted that this set of questions are focused
exclusively on human factor behaviour and performance. Hence, the questionnaire
feedback for part D is extremely important for depicting the strong points, the
weaknesses, the opportunities, the techniques and the possible improvements of
human element. This part is very closely related to STCW 95 and its recorded
implementation, in case of monitoring and evaluating the crew.
The provided questions of this part of the questionnaire were formulated to
investigate, whether ISM implementation and additional human factor issues were
encountered, as a fruitful occasion to check upon and improve the existing
qualifications of crews. This could be done taking into account, e.g. the quality
assurance and responsibility distribution among the shipping company personnel,
prefixed standards concerning human element behaviour, predetermined procedures
for on-board operations etc. In line with the above, the following questions were
posed regarding the measures and practices that were adopted by companies, in order
to ensure the proper level of training. Actually, training can be handled as one of the
main constituents of human factor performance, but at the same time, it cannot always
give the desired results. Thus, the questions below can indicate part’s D generic
direction:
· Has the implementation of the ISM Code obliged to an increase in the checking of
seafarer’s qualifications and certification before being enrolled in the company’s
vessels?
· Did new type of training for shore based personnel had to be established as result
of the implementation of the ISM Code? – Could you specify the new type of
training that was put in place?
· Did new type of training for sea based personnel (vessel crew) had to be
established as result of the implementation of the ISM Code? – Could you specify
the new type of training that was put in place?
· What new information is being sent to the vessels as result of the implementation
of the ISM Code?
Additionally, the questions of part D aimed at whether the companies, according to
the spirit of STCW 95, had already developed some kind of private and
supplementary training, or everything were simply driven by the enforcement of ISM.
The key point is the determination of nume rous shipping companies to improve their
training standards, through a voluntary and highly efficient approach, regardless of
IMO efforts to introduce ISM.
In part E, the questionnaire intended to obtain information on any available result
related to the implementation process, addressing human factor reaction,
comportment and ratings. It is recorded that even though more than 4 years have
elapsed since July 1998 (first phase of the ISM Code), it is still soon to determine and
evaluate the real effects of this IMO instrument, mainly on human factor and
managerial procedures. Nevertheless, there are some areas that can already provide
certain and valuable trends and conclusions. Accordingly, this part targeted to obtain
information on:
· Number of accidents;
· Number of incidents or reported near misses;
· Economic effects, such as insurance premiums or costs of repairs.
The comments coming from this part of the questionnaire were the most valuable in
qualitative terms, because of the broad spectrum of possible answers for the
interviewed companies and personnel. The provided answers were proven significant
on depicting company results, practices, comprehensive human behaviour and
consequent gained experience. Indicatively, one of the questions included in part E,
was the following quantitative one:
· Please give the number of deaths and personnel injuries, the number of
commercial contracts, the volume of the company fleet, the number of vessel
accidents, possible insurance premium bonuses and the number of reported near
misses since the date that the company adopted its Safety Management System.
The above question assays to evaluate any possible changes on various patterns and
tendencies concerning marine accidents (possibly with human factor as a mishap
cause), or any commercial benefits arisen from the implementation of a SMS. The last
question of this questionnaire cluster provides an opportunity to each of the
interlocutors to state their feelings and opinions regarding the implementation of SMS
and its real effect on the benefits and difficulties of all relative maritime transport
segments. This yields to a special focus on human element behaviour and
performance, in order to probe, all interconnected causes and relations that lead to
marine accidents. The rest of part E questions were addressed to investigate whether
the introduction of the ISM Code improved the work conditions and load in the
company/vessel; and to pinpoint any specific difficulties encountered within the
working practices in the company/vessel. At the same time, the questionnaire is
checking on the maintained communication between shore-management and the ship;
this provides the necessary means for reporting deficiencies and non-conformities
related to safety and management issues.
Questionnaire Results: Human Aspects Concerning Maritime Safety
The results yielded from the examined questionnaire cover an extensive spectrum of
topics that actually can reflect numerous human aspects and various regulatory
practices related to maritime transport. In particular, the questionnaire addresses
human factor, either through a structured bypass approach, such as is the ISM Code,
or in a direct manner, e.g. marine accidents, workload, working environment etc.
In this context, the provided results depict a generic attitude of a rather large, yet
“quiet”, number of respondents, particularly seafarers, who believe that the systems
currently in place are generating far too much paperwork, and they are requiring
additional administration and resources onboard ships. Nevertheless, an important
fragment of them appear to be prepared to give ISM a real chance, even if they have
already been overtaken by mountains of paper. Moreover, a certain number of
individuals have used a very similar language, in order to allude towards the same
consequence; that is the failure of relative efforts, if something is not done to reduce
the paperwork and administration. Questionnaire data reveal that the filling of ISM
checking sheets, is a time consuming task and most of the times done quickly, with no
special attention to the actual process. The questionnaire also shows that seafarers
have informed, their shore management, of the pressure that they feel, in order “to
complete the paperwork within the time frame, under STCW rules” (Martínez de Osés
et al, 2001). Hence as the answers manifest, this may resort to filling in forms and
writing reports on watch, at the expense of maintaining a proper lookout and attending
to the navigation of the vessel. Such a practice can be considered as a potential
contributing factor to marine accidents that are usually characterized as human-driven
accidents. Accordingly, Phil Anderson warns: “… this is not only an ill-advised,
highly dangerous practice, but has to be the ultimate irony as far as the whole
philosophy of ISM is concerned” (THEMES meeting, Brussels, Feb-2002).
Many of the comments recorded in the survey, suggests that a significant number of
seafarers, who perhaps started off with enthusiasm for ISM and other safety related
issues, are now losing faith concluding that there is a gap in this area. Phil Anderson
stated on this matter: “clearly this is very serious and we need to consider whether
such a conclusion is warranted” (THEMES meeting, Brussels, Feb-2002).
The above findings are depicted in Figure 2, which shows a generic view concerning
the acceptance of crewmembers for the ISM Code and other novel safety-oriented
initiatives. Thereby, according to the existing feedback of the specific questionnaire,
only the 40% of the examined cases seem to be positive towards the guidelines and
practices arisen from this IMO instrument. The rest 60% holds a negative position,
mainly because of the extra paper work, which is time and cost consuming. It must be
noted that the aforementioned percentages reflect the opinions of experienced and
active sea personnel who have to deal with such issues on a daily basis. This does not
mean that they oppose in any way, to the enhancement of marine safety, but on the
contrary they criticize some side effects of the specific effort (particularly concerning
its first years of practice), in order to augment safety and secure all stakeholders at
play. From human element point-of-view, extra paper work can point to additional
workload (which can mean fatigue, ennui etc), or even negligence of prescribed
duties; circumstances that are able to lead to marine accidents attributed to humanrelated aspects.
Negative View
60%
Positive View
40%
Figure 2: Human Response towards ISM Implementation & Other Safety Initiatives.
Howbeit according to the questionnaire feedback, there are ship operators, masters
and seafarers who seem to have passed through the “pain barrier” and can see the
light at the end of the tunne l. They are describing systems, where the paperwork and
administration are under control, there is full support and commitment from shore
personnel (company) and profits are augmenting. The above-described picture also
indicates a substantial potential for future decrease of marine accidents that are related
to human behaviour and comportment. In this context, Table 3 gives tentative, yet
revealing, results on some basic human-centred causes that, according to the answers
from the questionnaire, led to marine accidents. In general, the indicative figures
included in Table 3 are in line with other similar efforts (e.g. MAIB, DNV etc), but at
the same time it must be underlined, that the Assessment of human-related results need
extreme caution and prudence.
Table 3: Distribution of Human-Oriented Causes for Marine Accidents.
Basic Events Percentage (%)
Wrong speed & Incorrect use of radar 15,5
Inadequate performance of Officer on Watch 32,0
Wrong use of equipment 2,0
Misunderstanding due to language problems 1,0
Misunderstanding due to lack of training 1,0
Procedural problems 2,0
Incorrect decisions & actions due to stress,
fatigue & training 30,0
HMI problems 0,5
As it can be seen in Table 3, according to the presented questionnaire, the inadequate
performance of officers on watch constitutes the most frequent type of human-driven
marine accident; this failure applies mainly for the categories of collision/ramming,
power grounding and foundering, in various types of vessels. It seems, that the
introduction of STCW 95 has not yet resolved all issues concerning the proper way of
watchkeeping, posing the implementation of STCW regulation/guideline, Chapter
VIII, Section A-VIII/2, Part 3-1 and Section B-VIII/2, Part 3-1, Navigational watch,
in question. More specifically, the most common violations recorded are the
following ones:
· Bridge unattended or under manned;
· Limited visibility;
· Unexperienced officers;
· Officers non-familiarized with the vessel.
All these components should be mitigated, as result of company policy, crew
motivation and efficient regulatory regime. STCW provides a detailed list of
watchkeeping duties and obligations, in the outline of safe vessel navigation.
However it is evident, that the success of this task lies entirely on human factor and its
aspects. Therefore, the element of motivation or the avoidance of tedium/stress
situations for the crewmembers should be considered as possible ways out, with the
desired results.
Table 3 also shows that a very large portion of human-driven causes for marine
accidents has to do with incorrect decisions and actions due to stress, fatigue and lack
of training. It should be noted, that these parameters are allocated to all types of
vessels and sizes, but they are mostly related with types of accidents such as, powered
grounding, collision/ramming, fire/explosion and mechanical problem. Once more, a
rather complete regulatory regime is not capable to fill the inadequacy of human
behaviour and performance. STCW in Chapter VIII, Section A-VIII/1, Fitness for
duty, gives the respective standards (e.g. 10 hours of rest per day), in order to
eliminate the possibility of fatigue during watchkeeping. Moreover, SOLAS in
Chapter III, Regulation 19 Emergency training and drills, and Regulation 35,
Training manual and on-board training aids, and ISM Code in Chapter 6, Resources
and personnel, and Chapter 8, Emergency preparedness, cover adequately the issue of
training with multiple guidelines on the specific topic. Nevertheless in all cases, the
key factor is again the performance of human element, even in the form of company
management policy; motivation, training, workload, working environment, fatigue,
stress-free situations, alcohol-free practices, attention, leadership etc are important
constituents towards the enhancement of marine safety, from human factor point-ofview.
Another human-oriented problem included in Table 3, is the misunderstanding due to
language problems; the specific questionnaire has recorded maritime accidents that
were at least, partially attributed to such difficulties. This is another example of
human failure leading to accident, even if the corresponding regulatory framework
exists. In particular, the ISM Code in Chapter 6, Resources and personnel, provides
for a common working language on-board the vessel to avoid similar problems and
consequent mishaps. Only it is the crewmembers that are called to follow these
guidelines, and make sure that such problems will not affect the safe voyage of the
vessel.
The implementation of novel safety-oriented schemes is in position to enhance the
standing benchmarks of maritime transport, as far as safety and productive
management are concerned. ISM can be viewed as a typical to-be example for the
aforementioned perspective. Thus, the elimination of a number of known accident
causes – related to the human factor component, e.g. extra workload, distraction of
attention etc – may lead to safer and error-free voyages. Figure 3 depicts the
questionnaire feedback concerning seafarer views on the number of vessel accidents
in conjunction with ISM and relative IMO guidelines. The majority of these answers
point towards positive trends; that is, at least the preservation, or even more, the
enhancement of marine safety and consequently, the decrement of the number of
vessel accidents.
Reduced
35%
Increased
15%
Maintained
50%
Figure 3: Quantitative Trends of Accidents as a Result from ISM Implementation.
According to Figure 3, seafarers seem to support that ISM has the potential to
enhance accident wise maritime safety, in a certain degree. Inter alia, they focus on
ISM, Chapter 9, Reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous
occurrences, which manifests that the implemented SMS should ensure that all
problems will be apart from reported to the company, thoroughly monitored and
investigated, in order to improve safety and prevent pollution. Likewise, ISM Chapter
7, Development of plans for shipboard operations and Chapter 8, Emergency
Preparedness, are believed to pay an important role into vessel safety, whereas ISM
Chapter 10, Maintenance of the ship and equipment, settles the maintenance topic in a
structured and efficient way. Moreover, ISM Chapter 12, Company verification,
review and Assessment covers all the actions necessary to uphold an adequate SMS.
Seafarers perceive that the common point of all these guidelines is the allocation of
responsibilities to shore (company), which is considered a rather fruitful step towards
a realistic approach to the risk exposure matrix. Shore personnel should take their
actual share of responsibility, in the outline of an effort aiming at safe vessels and
clean seas.
The negative trend in Figure 3 (15%) is based on the opinion of few of the
interviewees, who seem to believe that human involvement in marine accidents can be
increased, due to the implementation of ISM. These crewmembers feel that problems
such as extra paperwork, augmented workload, lack of initiative etc will overcome the
benefits from ISM and lead to maritime accidents. It should be mentioned that this
type of answers were acquired mainly from European Union (EU)crews.
The common belief should be that ISM can work and strengthen the safety framework
of maritime transport procedures. It is in a position to aid human performance in a
multi-fold manner, in order to mitigate its critical involvement in the vast majority of
marine accidents. IMO and the rest of the maritime community need to look very
carefully at what several shipping companies have achieved in this area. More
specifically, they should focus on how they have overcome the paperwork and
administration problems, and how they have motivated their staff to persevere with
the implementation and maintenance of their SMSs. According to the questionnaire,
shipping companies have increased the screening of potential crewmembers – based
on their qualifications and certifications – during their enrollment phase, as a result of
ISM implementation. Indeed, Figure 4 shows that about 73% of the interviewees state
that ISM has ameliorated the recruitment procedures targeting to well-trained and
motivated crews. The specific upgrade of sea personnel results to better human
behaviour and performance practices and to the enhancement of maritime safety
levels.
73%
27%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Better Screening
Same/Worse Screening
Figure 4: Enhancement of Crew Recruitment Standards due to ISM Implementation.
ISM Chapter 6, Resources and personnel, creates the generic framework for the
results included in Figure 4. The key point arises from its structured approach, which
includes the corresponding STCW standards. This means that the implementation of
ISM forces the shipping companies to document their screening procedures, in order
to prove that they comply with STCW 95 (e.g. Chapter II, Regulation II/3, Section AII/3, Deck department: Minimum mandatory requirements for officers in charge of
navigational watch). Hence, it is expected that the recruitment standards will improve,
resulting to qualified crews on-board vessels.
Another important finding derived from the presented survey was the contradictory
views and perceptions concerning human element matters, between EU crews and
personnel and those coming from shipping labour countries (e.g. Philippines, Ukraine
etc). In particular, seafarers from economically advanced nations are mainly holding
the middle ground, if not leaning towards a rather negative attitude towards the role of
ISM and the consequent amelioration of human behaviour and comportment.
However, when the opinions of other nationalities are also taken into account, then an
enormous shift is recorded towards a positive stand; provided that all paperwork and
practical problems can be solved, in order to diminish relative accident causes (e.g.
distraction, boredom, etc). Thus, a significant cultural issue can be identified from the
aforementioned observation. Masters and officers from western cultures believe that
they derive from old, established shipping companies or traditions, where safety was
already being effectively managed. To these people, this IMO instrument was neither
wanted nor needed and has not contributed to increased safety standards or reduced
rate of accidents – especially for the types related to human errors. On the other hand,
it maybe the case that some of the “non-western” nationals, who do not come from
such traditions, have found indeed that the ISM Code provides them with a good and
sound structure to manage maritime safety; proving a de facto valuable and useful
tool. Under the umbrella of a SMS, they feel that they are given a more productive
and friendly working environment, while at the same time they enjoy the absence of
certain human-oriented contributing factors to marine accidents.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Increased Reduced Maintained
Figure 5: Insurance Fees and Maritime Safety Scheme (ISM) Implementation.
The questionnaire reveals that most surveyed individuals think, more or less, in the
same manner, when the insurance premium is concerned; they hold a rather
conservative stance regarding the implementation of various safety schemes, like ISM
and the transition of insurance fees. Figure 5 shows the results that are derived from
the questionnaire feedback, where it is evident that the majority of the answers give a
neutral view for insurance costs in the maritime industry. Only about 13% of the
questionnaires support the line of reduced insurance fees, as result of IMO guidelines
for human factor and safety (ISM); fact that should be addressed in depth.
Conclusions
Safety is a crucial attribute relating to maritime transport; more specifically, it has
many facets and it is difficult to deal with – even more in a proactive sense. At the
same time, marine safety is considered to be indispensable for a viable and
“attractive” maritime transport network. Its deficiencies can have an important impact
on various maritime transport stakeholders (e.g. crewmembers, passengers, cargo,
shipping companies, sea and coastal environments etc), as well with damages to third
parties. The development of a full proof structure from safety point-of-view is
definitely not a trivial task, yet an efficient approach should be configured in order to
achieve the best possible results.
Statistics show that the most common accident types for commercial vessels are,
fire/explosions, mechanical problems, collisions, groundings and hull damages.
Moreover, the pivotal cause for the occurrence of these accident lies on human
behaviour and performance; that is on human element. Its interference can militate on
various procedures and event chains, causing more problems and provoking
unpleasant consequences, or on the other hand improving difficult situations and even
preventing the escalation of threatening incidents. The term human factor is an
umbrella that covers various human-related aspects, such as training issues, problems
on watch, lack of concentration, communication problems, fatigue etc. Additionally,
marine safety can be enhanced through management practices, knowing that a suitable
framework can relief certain difficulties encountered in the maritime transport system.
Under this perspective, IMO ha s issued several regulations focusing on human
element and maritime safety; ISM is one of the most important of them. It was
developed to enforce, through predetermined and established guidelines, safety
practices on board ships targeting to the protection of human lives and the
preservation of the corresponding environment. Hence, ISM is considered a prime
vehicle to introduce solid safeguards and acknowledge useful practices for the day-today ship and company routine. ISM addresses the responsible party for every task,
brings forward structured checklists for every action done onboard vessels and
generally creates a safety net for the sea and shore personnel. The key issue for a
fruitful implementation of ISM is, the success of a well-balanced equilibrium between
extra workload and safety motivation (safety culture) for crew and shore personnel.
SMS should not allow, in any case, the crew (which could be stressed, under manned
etc) to focus on the relative paperwork and not to pay attention to fundamental duties
during a sea voyage, e.g. keep a proper look out, avoid a main engine black out etc.
The presented questionnaire has to do with marine safety and safety management
(ISM) issues, from human element point-of-view. Its development, in a structured
way, aimed at presenting the true consequences derived from ISM implementation
and the impact of human factor on marine safety. As already mentioned, the
documentation regarding the involvement of human element in accidents (for the
maritime industry) is poor up-to-date; therefore similar efforts should be viewed as
useful instruments in formulating the generic safety component, in the outline of
maritime transport. Recapitulating, the following findings from the specific original
questionnaire can be highlighted:
· Shipping companies have placed their attention mostly on safety-related aspects,
such as prevention and training, which are mainly, if not exclusively, human
factor aspects. Marine safety has been understood to be the main goal of ISM,
dragging other related questions behind its wake.
· The implementation of ISM has made documentation and report management
much more complicated. For instance, the corresponding extra paperwork
(justification of every action) has brought the crew to a boring situation, which
can increase the possibility of marine accidents due to human errors; this is a fact
that should be efficiently dealt with. Authorities, companies etc should not permit
to some possible weaknesses of the SMS approach to overshadow its numerous
safety-driven advantages; a crucial fact is that human factor can be adequately
positioned in a broader maritime framework, in an objective sense.
· There are certain cultural issues that lead seafarers from labour supplying
countries to a favourable opinion for the ISM Code. The real reasons can only be
assumed, but it is completely understandable that labour-force providing countries
do not possess a deep culture in safety aspects; like within their educational
process. Thus, they perceive SMS as a good guide of procedures and liabilities, in
order to succeed adequate performance and enhanced safety.
· In case of an accident, the use of ISM guidelines improves specific points of the
action/event chain that finally concludes with the unfortunate mishap. However,
there are a lot “deeper” topics, such as personal motivation, crew attitude and
predisposition, or even the subject of crew honesty towards a necessary
investigation, that still need to be addressed. Questions as fundamental as log
book disappearance after an accident (e.g. in the case of the single hull M/T
PRESTIGE) should be considered essential from safety point-of-view, and nonexistent within a proper SMS approach.
· It seems that an important portion of human-driven marine accidents can be
attributed to inadequate performance of officers on watch. IMO has already
addressed strongly this matter with the introduction of STCW. Another big part of
human related accidents comes from incorrect actions and choices due to fatigue,
improper training, stress, boredom etc. Other significant human-centred accident
causes is related to the improper usage of radar and the incorrect choice of vessel
speed or to language problems etc.
· The interviewees believe that the implementation of safety-oriented schemes, such
as is the SMS approach, can at least maintain, and hopefully reduce the number of
ship accidents on a yearly basis. This is done because this effort handles
efficiently human factor issues and therefore, assays to neutralize a basic
player/cause concerning the occurrence and escalation of maritime accidents.
· The general view concerning the implementation of the Code is negative to a
percentage of 60% of the recorded answers. This occurs because seafarers
strongly believe that ISM is equivalent to extra paper work, inc reased workload,
worst working conditions and time and cost consuming tasks in expense of marine
safety. Whereas, the rest 40% maintain a positive attitude, pinpointing the
numerous advantages of this instrument and conscious that there are changes
taking place regarding the philosophy of shipping companies and the mentality of
their shore and sea personnel.
It is obvious, that the passage towards safer ships and cleaner seas crosses the sector
of human behaviour and performance; the reduction of human faults should be viewed
as the key achievement, in the context of such an effort. Fewer human errors can be
safely translated into less accidents, fewer fatalities and oil spills and enhanced levels
of safety concerning all maritime transport practices and procedures.
Acknowledgements
The work reported in this paper has been partially supported by the European
Thematic Network “THEMES” and the Commission of the European Union.
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