To what extent has the importance of the Tet Offensive of 1968 been overrated? The Tet Offensive began on January 30th 1968, consisting of a series of simultaneous communist uprisings across 36 provincial and 64 district capitals of South Vietnam. Tet is an undisputed turning point in the war leading to almost immediate de-escalation of US commitment. The importance of Tet lies in its clear exposure of Johnson’s illegitimate claims of progress and the ineffectiveness of previous escalation in Vietnam. This caused a significant loss of support for the war, giving Johnson no choice but to reduce commitment to Vietnam.
However, the de-escalation of commitment after Tet may not have been a result of Tet. There were clear problems with the American war effort before the offensive began which contributed to Johnson’s decision to end escalation of the conflict in March 1968. Tet revealed these problems in the war effort leading up to 1968. The review and change of US policy after the Tet Offensive was not necessarily because of the Tet Offensive, rather, the Offensive came at a time when US policy needed to be reviewed. The importance of Tet was that it emphasised the war could only be perpetuated not won.
The view that Tet caused (rather than contributed to) American withdrawal from Vietnam is overrated. By the end of 1968, public support for the war had declined substantially. A majority of the public had lost faith in the war after Tet which is shown by the plummet of Johnson’s approval ratings[1]. However, this decline in support is unjustified as American reportings of Tet presented a particularly negative and hostile picture of its implications on the war effort so that Americans would feel it was a defeat. This shows that the public outrage after Tet was overrated.
Historians disagree on the cause of this decline in support. Ruane, Record and Schulzinger all claim that it was the Tet Offensive that caused the decline in public support for the war. They argue that the widespread loss of public support for the war after Tet gave the administration no choice but to de-escalate US commitment, particularly because 1968 was general election year. Ruane states that Tet exposed the gap of credibility ‘between Johnsons assurances of progress and battlefield reality’. Assuring progress was the method used by the administration to subdue public opposition to the war before 1968.
Similarly, Record states that Tet ‘undermined officialdoms inflated claims of the war’s progress’ and therefore revealing the ineffective use of American lives and money. Schulzinger, however, emphasises the effect negative news reporting of Tet had on public opinion; ‘televised scenes of the grisly fighting turned pubic opinion against continuing the war in the same direction’. Schulzinger agrees with Ruane and Record’s interpretation that Tet caused a decline in public support for the war but blames this on the exaggerated news reports of the Offensive.
In this instance, Ruane, Schulzinger and Record agree on Tet’s contribution to the decline in public support after Tet, thus presenting Tet’s importance to not be overrated. However, Schulzinger goes on to say that the public outrage after Tet was based on unreliable reporting which makes it unjustified, ‘initial reports of the North Vietnamese successes were greatly exaggerated’. Karnow and Lawrence support Schulzinger’s view that news reportings were exaggerated.
Karnow shows General Westmoreland’s and Peter Braestrup’s (a correspondent for the Washington Post who covered the Tet Offensive) criticism of the distorted journalism on Tet. Furthermore, Karnow’s point supported by [2], where Westmoreland blames the media for the ultimate defeat in Vietnam by misleading the American people and several Washington officials. In addition, the article shows an extract from Peter Braestrup’s statement at the symposium, where he admits to projecting ‘an unsound image of disaster’ and failure ‘to set the record straight later’.
This primary source supports Schulzinger, Karnow and Lawrence’s view that news reportings on Tet were greatly exaggerated, thus improving the reliability and accuracy of these historians. However, both Karnow and Lawrence claim that the reportings on Tet did little to alter public opinion despite their exaggerations. Karnow says that public support for the war had been declining steadily two years before Tet due to rising taxes and casualties and the ‘feeling that there was no end in view’; ‘by late 1967, a plurality of Americans had concluded that the United States had “made a mistake” in committing combat troops in Vietnam.
Similarly, Lawrence claims that opinion polls after Tet only showed a continuation of gradual decline of support for the war which started in early 1967. Like Schulzinger, Karnow and Lawrence acknowledge the exaggerated news reporting on Tet, but they disagree with Schulzinger’s view that these biased reporting’s had a significant effect on the public. However, Lawrence and Karnow’s disagreement on when the decline in support for the war began reduces the credibility of the historians.
Karnow claims that public support for the war had been in decline two years prior to Tet whereas Lawrence claims it started in early 1967. Furthermore, Karnow contradicts himself by claiming that Tet only caused a continuation in decline of public support for the war but goes on to claim that endorsement of Johnson’s handling of the war fell from 40% to 26% during the six weeks of Tet[3]. Additionally, Mydans[4] clearly states that the Tet Offensive ‘helped turn American public opinion decisively against the war’ which defies both Karnow’s and Lawrence’s argument.
Moreover, this article supports the view of Schulzinger, Ruane and Record, perhaps making their argument more weighty and accurate than Karnow and Lawrence’s argument. It seems the view that news reports on the Tet offensive were exaggerated which caused a substantial decline in public support for the war is a credible one. This shows that the importance of Tet was overrated by the media and therefore the public at the time. A further argument demonstrating the importance of the Tet Offensive was overrated is that it was clear the war could not be won by 1967 and Tet merely consolidated this.
Ruane, Schulzinger and Lawrence all agree with this interpretation. Ruane clearly states that America was in a quagmire by 1967, ‘unable to win the war in South Vietnam, only perpetuate it’. Ruane supports this view by showing the ineffectiveness of previous escalation and claiming the Vietcong were able to use their guerrilla tactics to dictate the pace of the war and ‘gradually erode enemy strength and morale’. Although Lawrence and Schulzinger agree with Ruane’s view, they give more definitive evidence to support it.
Lawrence mentions the Robert Komer report in September 1967 which maintained good progress was being made in Vietnam and 68% of the South Vietnamese population lived under “reasonably secure conditions”. Lawrence goes on to show that both civilian officials and the CIA disagreed with Komer’s report, claiming that no progress was being made, the US had failed to achieve any of its goals and they disputed Komer’s claim that there were 285,000 north Vietnamese soldiers in the South, counting between 500,000 and 600,000. Similarly, Schulzinger states that the communists ‘had been able to adapt their tactics to the increased U.
S. pressure’ and emphasises the importance of the CIA warnings, claiming that they concluded the communists would put more intensive pressure on US during the election year of 1968. Both Lawrence and Schulzinger mention that the CIA warnings were ignored. All three historians agree that the State Department and the military accepted things were not going well in 1967 but ‘believed things would look better in a year’[5]. The interpretation of Schulzinger and Lawrence is very reliable as it can be supported by primary CIA sources which tended to be more consistently reliable than military reports[6].
Carver clearly suggests that there is evidence that the Tet offensive will take place ‘(enemy) documents call for all-out, coordinated attacks throughout South Vietnam’. Caver also condemns Westmoreland’s optimistic assertions of communist manpower, stating it is ‘impossible for MACV to engage in serious or meaningful discussion of evidence’. The historians are further supported by Rostow’s response to the CIA’s findings, where he dismisses them as invalid ‘assumptions’[7]. This shows how the CIA had predicted Tet would take place and disagreed with the military optimism flowing from Saigon.
It seems the interpretation that the US was making no progress by 1967 is an accurate one. This demonstrates that the importance of Tet was overrated as the fundamental tactics of the US were always ineffective and massive escalation to the point of nuclear war would be the only military solution to this. It was not just the public that began to lose faith in the war after Tet, several Hawks did as well. This point is particularly emphasised by Ruane who uses a primary account of the ‘wise men’ revolt by George Ball to support his point[8].
Ruane claims that Johnson sought council after Westmoreland’s request for 206,000 extra troops from some previously hawkish advisors and a group of foreign policy experts called the ‘wise men’. The source demonstrates how Tet made a dramatic impact on the ‘wise men’. When the wise men had previously met in October 1967, they ‘saw reasons for hope… slow but steady progress’. However, the post Tet meeting was concluded rather differently. A majority of group agreed that ‘we can no longer do the job we set out to do inn the time we have left and we must begin to disengage’ (Acheson, former Secretary of State).
Those who disagreed were silenced by Acheson on the grounds that the US intervention could not prevent the North from invading the south by military means; this became the consensus view and was presented to Johnson. Furthermore, this contemporary source is later supported by Lawrence who states that the ‘wise men’ supported the administrations handing of the war at its meeting before Tet but drew the opposite conclusion after Tet ‘recommended against further troop commitments but also urged the president to stop bombing the North and to consider how to negotiate a withdrawal from South Vietnam’[9].
Lawrence goes on to say that Clifford (Secretary of Defence) advised further escalation would ‘increase bloodshed and domestic strife with no assurance of military progress’. This consensus between Lawrence and Ruane increases the reliability of their arguments. Similarly, Karnow and Record emphasise the inability of Hawks to justify continuation of the war after Tet[10]. Karnow mentions how Johnson’s own aides were in outrage of the optimistic views flowing from Saigon after Tet. However, Ruane, Lawrence and Schulzinger all claim that pro–war confidence of General Westmoreland never wavered, consistently categorising it as a military defeat.
Lawrence argues that Westmoreland justified his requested for more troops in order to ‘build on the successful Tet counter attacks and cripple communists’, maintaining that ‘Tet was a last gasp action by an exhausted enemy’[11]. Although this shows that not all hawks were forced into remission by the offensive, its accuracy is limited. Both Karnow and Record question the confidence of Westmoreland, claiming that he was devastated and vulnerable after Tet. Karnow argues the lack of reliability in the confidence flowing from Saigon, claiming that it was a ‘deliberate attempt by Westmoreland to justify his earlier expressions of confidence.
Karnow supports his argument by quoting Holbrooke’s recollection of his trip to Vietnam as a US official after Tet; Westmoreland was “dispirited, deeply shaken, almost a broken man”. This is a first hand account of Westmoreland’s attitude after Tet which is more reliable than his messages to Washington because Westmoreland’s intention was to mask his uncertainty in order to avoid contradiction and embarrassment. This shows how Karnow and Record’s interpretation of Westmoreland’s insecurity is a more credible thesis.
Although Westmoreland’s confidence may have been affected by Tet, the confidence of the Joint Chief’s of Staff’s (JCS) certainly wasn’t, showing that not all hawks felt threatened by the 1968 communist offensive. Both Karnow and Record demonstrate that they used Tet as an opportunity to manipulate Westmoreland into requesting more troops. Karnow claims that Westmoreland never wanted to request for more troops in order to protect his reputation but he was persuaded by Wheeler (the JCS chairman) on the grounds the Johnson was “not prepared to accept defeat” (Wheeler)[12].
Record supports this interpretation by stating that Wheeler exploited Westmoreland’s vulnerability after Tet to rethink his belief that Tet was a military disaster. Wheeler believed fundamentally that full mobilisation of the reserves was how the war should be fought and failure to do this had caused a lack of progress in Vietnam. This shows how the importance of Tet was overrated in the sense that the JCS remained unfazed by its effects and continued to push for full mobilisation of the reserves. In conclusion, all five historians both agree and disagree with the interpretation that the importance of the Tet offensive has been overrated.
However, it is clear that there is consensus among the historians that the importance Tet was overrated as a whole with some exceptions such as the pro-war attitude of the JCS and Westmoreland after Tet. For me, it is clear the interpretation that the importance of the Tet offensive has been overrated is an accurate one. The main reason for Johnson’s decisions to de-escalate after Tet was the ineffectiveness of the war effort which was not caused by Tet. The lack of progress in Vietnam had always been the case and Tet merely prevented the administration from spinning the true nature of the war. ———————– 1] ‘During the six weeks following the initial communist attacks, public approval of his overall performance dropped from 48 percent to 36 percent – and, more dramatically, endorsement for his handling of the war fell from 40 percent to 26 percent’ – Karnow, Vietnam, A History (1991). P559 [2] ‘Hawks and Doves Refight Tet Offensive at Symposium’ article, Feb 27th 1978, New York Times [3] ‘endorsement for his handling of the war fell from 40 percent to 26 percent’ –Vietnam, A History, 1991, Karnow, P559 [4] ‘Tran Van Tra of Vietnam,77; Commander in Tet Offensive’ article, April 26th 1996 New York Times [5] Schulzinger 6] https://www. cia. gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-and-the-vietnam-policymakers-three-episodes-1962-1968/epis3. html [7] https://www. cia. gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-and-the-vietnam-policymakers-three-episodes-1962-1968/epis3. html [8] George Ball recollections in Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989 edn), pp. 31-2; verbatim records of ‘wise men’ deliberations, 26 March 1968, in David M. Barrett (ed. ), Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam papers: A Documentary Collection ( College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), pp. 713-15 [9] Lawrence [10] ‘hawks were unable to work up any enthusiasm for a war whose purpose had been defined in terms so bloodless that they could not justify or redeem the blood being shed for its sake’- Record, The Wrong War: Why We Lost In Vietnam (1998), P55 [11] Ruane [12] Karnow, Vietnam, A History (1991) – P562
