Cuba Essay, Research Paper

The thought that the Cuban Revolution of 1959 was a peasant revolution or had a peasant character is awidely held misconception, one which has been dispersed by the Rebels post-revolutionary rhetoric and the wealth ofsympathetic cognition which based its reading of the revolution upon this propaganda. To delegate an event ascomplex as the Cuban Revolution any peculiar nature is a drastic simplification and confuses the many factorswhich led to the revolution and its triumph. Bing the supporters in the originating the revolutionists themselvesunderstood really clearly that their revolution was non the consequence of merely the provincials support, so they must hold hadcertain grounds for retracing the revolution the manner they did. The first component to look over is the reconstructionitself, through the post-revolutionary propaganda, and to find precisely what sort of a vision the Rebels wanted topromote as the rebellion. Next the existent revolution will be studied and compared to the Rebels imagined revolution.

Finally, some of the possible grounds for the Rebels divergence will be stated and the revolution itself will bereexamined sing the thoughts brought frontward. When Castro and his group reached Cuba on the Granma December 2, 1956, their scheme, as they stated atthe clip and admitted subsequently, was to take Santiago with the aid of Frank Pais urban insurrectional organisation, andthen attack the remainder of Cuba from at that place in coordination with a immense general work stoppage ( Bonachea & A ; San Martin, 1974 ) .This portion anarcho-syndicalist, portion Blanquist scheme was rapidly delayed, nevertheless, as the onslaught on Santiago failedon all sides and the guerillas were forced to fly to the Sierra Maestra. The Rebels in the mountains rapidly cameinto contact with the provincials at that place and a concerted relationship began to develop between the two after initialmistrust by the provincials. The provincials who had to digest the persecution of Batista s military units bit by bit beganto alter their attitude toward us. They fled to us for safety to take part in our guerilla units. In this manner our rankand file changed from metropolis people to provincials ( Lavan, 1967, p.10 ) . Out of this practical relationship, which CheGuevara explained in April 1959, grew the mythology that became the revolution s bequest. Guevara subsequently said theguerrilla and the provincial became joined into a individual mass, so that & # 8230 ; we became portion of the provincials ( Thomas, 1977, p.154 ) . It was this cryptic bond that gave the revolution as a whole its peasant nature. By populating with the provincials, the Rebels explained, they had come to experience for their demands, the rule demand being set down reform. Therefore, as Guevaraexplained, the Rebels adopted their land reform motto which mobilized the laden Cuban multitudes to comeforward to contend and prehend the land. From this clip on the first great societal program was determined, and it subsequently becamethe streamer and primary spearhead of our motion ( Lavan, 1967, p.11 ) . The post-revolutionary vision was one in which land reform was the spearhead, and the intellectuals werethe spearbearer, for, as Castro explained in February 1962, the peasantry is a category which, because of the unculturedstate in which it is unbroken needs the radical and political leading of the radical intellectuals, for withoutthem it would non by itself be able to immerse into the battle and accomplish triumph ( Kenner, Martin, & A ; Petras, 1969, p.113 ) . From the mountains, this united peasant-rebel force would brush down into the field and gaining control the citiesfrom the countryside. The Rebels wanted the universe to believe that the full revolution had merely succeeded throughvast campesino engagement. The other radical component that the Rebels sharply reconstructed, after they took power, was therole of the urban opposition. As theirs was a peasant revolution, the metropoliss had to hold played a secondary axial rotation, somuch clip was spent understating the function of the metropoliss in the revolution. The rebels anti-city propaganda took twoforms theoretical and practical. Theoretically, Castro stated in 1966, It is absurd and about condemnable to seek and directguerrillas from the metropolis ( Kenner et al, 1969, p.132 ) . The urban Rebels were excessively ready to compromise and maketruces, they could non understand the guerilla and would most likely work against them. Several cases of therebels disclaiming their urban opposite numbers aid to carry through this theoretical consideration. It was after the failure of thegeneral work stoppage of 9 April, 1958, Guevara claimed, that the Rebels realized that the urban motion could non win ( Lavan, 1967, p.11 ) . The urban revolution can all excessively easy be smothered by the authorities ( AlRoy, 1972, p.9 ) and therefore the countryside was the necessary site for the revolution. The revolution that these work forces created was one ofbasic provincial base and character, led by a little group of intellectuals which had gained the peasant category awarenessthrough sympathetic contact, and that swept over the counterrevolutionary metropoliss on its manner to get downing a governmentwhich would be the best friend of the provincials ( Kenner et al, 1969, p.58 ) . The genuineness of this image isobviously dubious. Although it has its protagonists, the earliest possibly being Huberman and Sweezy in their book, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution, most of the facts on which they base their findings are clouded, in this instance, gottenduring a short visit to Cuba with interviews from merely high ranking leaders. What is of import nevertheless, is to obtainwhat of the Rebels post-facto vision is grounded in fact and what is a good constructed fiction. From there aconclusion may be reached as to the ground for their historical misrepresentation. The best manner to analyse the revolution is chronologically, get downing with the unfortunate landing of theGranma and following the development of the revolution from at that place. This brings up the first deformation of history, thatbecause the Rebel party consisted of merely 82 guerillas, rapidly cut down to eighteen before they reached theSierra Maestra, it is assumed that it was the extraordinary gallantry of this little group that eventually defeated thegovernment. This ignores the fact that there was already a tenable urban rebellion motion, on which theguerrilla set would depend on wholly. The urban M-26-7 group, under the way of Frank Pais, was awaitingCastro s reaching to take Santiago. In add-on there was besides the Directorio Revolucionario, led by Echevarria, dedicated to violent urban rebellion. These two groups, along with many other organisations and persons, wouldprovide much needed support to Castro when it was most indispensable. Quickly after the Granma catastrophe, Castro and his compatriots regrouped in the Sierra Maestra, the country towhich they were to withdraw in instance of failure ( Bonachea & A ; San Martin, 1974, p.78 ) . They did so with the aid ofthe local peasantry, who led them through the dense forests to happen each other ( Bonachea & A ; San Martin, 1974, p.89 ) .The Rebels set up a base to run their operations. These operations nevertheless, shortly involved much more than singleencounters with rural guard barracks ; as they lived in the thick of provincials, they depended on them, non merely forguides or buying supplies, but on their trueness. The provincials had no understanding for the rural guard, but neither didthey for the Rebels, therefore, they would frequently turn informer on Castro and his work forces ( Bonachea & A ; San Martin, 1974, p.90 ) . In order to antagonize this, Castro set up a system of barbarous but just radical justness. All betrayers wereexecuted instantly, and the executings were advertised widely in the peasant population. At the same clip, nevertheless, the Rebels were really just in their commercial traffics with the provincials, and Castro established a strictrevolutionary codification to maintain his soldiers in line, including commissariats specifying colza and other offenses against thepeasantry as a capital discourtesy. Although the radical jurisprudence was rough, at least it was non elected, and the peasantsgradually came to see the revolutionists as the jurisprudence of the Sierra. The Sierras provincials were cognizant that theirsurvival and security depended chiefly on whether they helped the guerillas or non ( Bonachea & A ; San Martin, 1974, p.91 ) , one bookman wrote. Thus the provincials were half terrorized, half encouraged to back up the guerillas over thebatistianos. The function of the provincials within the motion was non every bit heroic as it was subsequently made out to be. Of the troopsthemselves, figures differ as to the proportion of provincials to urban recruits. Bonachea & A ; San Martin, for illustration, states that a bulk of the Rebel forces were metropolis people, largely immature, educated, and male ( 1974, p. 95 ) . Tosupport this statement is the March 3, 1957, motion of fifty-two armed and supplied work forces from Santiago to theSierra. Harmonizing to Bonachea & A ; San Martin, the figure of guerillas continued to turn due to these regular urbaninflows, despite regular provincial abandonments, who would instead return to their little, unproductive secret plans of land ( 1974, p.95 ) . Huberman and Sweezy on the other manus, claim that from three-fourthss to four-fifths of the rebelforces were provincials ( 1961, p.78 ) . However, the thought that peasant support in the forces, at any degree, would give therevolution a peasant character is disputed by two facts. First, the provincials were non promoted to officers and, in fact, most were non even soldiers ; they were chiefly used for transit and communicating. Since there were nopeasants in leading, it is difficult to believe that the motion had any true peasant nature. Second, every bit tardily as May1958, even the most Revolutionary sympathetic authors merely put the entire figure of guerillas at three hundred ( Huberman & A ; Sweezy, 1961, p.63 ) . Even if they were all provincials, three hundred provincials barely seems like amassive popular motion. As Castro s motion in the hills began to convey together his clasp on the land and the people, Pais beganplanning earnestly for a general work stoppage, which was to co-occur with Castro s outgrowth from the Sierra and attackupon metropoliss ( Bonachea & A ; San Martin, 1974, p.142 ) . Bonachea & A ; San Martin make a point here that Pais was still thereal leader of the M-26-7, and that Castro was still low-level to him ( 1974, p.146 ) . The general work stoppage was the realweapon, Castro was merely at that place to take over one time the work stoppage had immobilized Cuba. However, Echevarria, who hadalso been involved in be aftering the work stoppage, was killed in March, and Pais was killed in July, so the lone revolutionaryleader left was Castro. Desiring to do his base even firmer before the work stoppage began, Castro instructed all otherrevolutionary motions to maintain him good supplied in the Sierra ( Bonachea & A ; San Martin, 1974, p.146 ) . Since hewas the lone popular leader staying, Castro s power, support, and resources grew vastly. In September, there was an rebellion at the Cayo Loco Naval Base in Cienfuegos which involved planningbetween the M-26-7 and naval officers. Bing a secret plan begun chiefly by the armed forces, it did non necessitate Castro s aid. Therevolt ended in full urban warfare between the M-26-7 forces and the crewmans against Batista s ground forces military personnels. The deficiency

of coordination between the metropoliss prevented the motion from turning, and the rebellion tungsten

as shortly stopped by Batistaand was followed by really barbarous repression ( Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 147 ) . But what this event truly shows, is that there was already contention in the military due merely to gross out with Batista. At this clip besides, the Directorio Revolucionario sent eight hundred guerillas to the Sierra Escambray inorder to set up an urban and rural guerilla battle ( Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p.184 ) . A few months subsequently, Raul Castro was sent to the Sierra Cristal to set up the 2nd forepart, Frank Pais. Once once more the development of the 2nd forepart in Oriente was mostly the consequence of the urban belowground attempts of Mayari, Gauntanamo, andSantiago de Cuba ( Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p.191 ) . It is interesting to compare Raul Castro s intervention of thepeasants with his brothers. Raul had a much more democratic attitude, he let provincials lift up as far in the rebel officerranks as they could, where Fidel had no officer provincials. However this democratic attitude was non merely for thepeasants, Raul besides encouraged agricultural workers and mineworkers in the country to fall in his forces. This resulted in muchpopular support for Raul in the encompassing country. Therefore, during the summer of 1957 up to April 1958 the revolutionwas turning in the Sierra Maestra, in military Numberss, and on two new foreparts. However, as Che Guevara stated inNovember 1957, they were still expecting the general work stoppage. The Sierra Maestra is geting at the terminal of its fortresscommitment, and is acquiring ready to establish its hosts of battlers across the fields ( Lavan, 1967, p.37 ) . Victorywas professed on two things, Che stated, the combustion of canefields and the general work stoppage which will be the finalblow. The general work stoppage is the unequivocal arm ( Lavan, 1967, p.37 ) . At this point the rebellion was still no more of a peasant revolution so it was when the Granma wentashore. The revolution still consisted of rural guerillas dependant on the urban resistance for military personnels, supplies, andultimately, a general work stoppage among the workers and organized by the urban resistance made it possible for them tomove from the hills. The provincials had influence merely in the lesser of the two foreparts, and even at that place, it was shared withthe working category. The general work stoppage was eventually planned by Castro for April 1958. The grounds for its dramatic failure arecontroversial, but a few facts which emerge point toward a sensible account. Fidel called the work stoppage and, againstthe advice of the M-26-7 who felt they were non ready, forced the radical leaders to follow. Then he did notdeliver the weaponries he had promised them and without which the work stoppage was impossible. It was such a catastrophe that anyplan for future work stoppages was hopeless. It appears that Castro intended for the work stoppage to be a failure in order tocompletely consolidate his power at the caput of the revolution. His power had grown to the point that he felt hecould licking Batista, and he needed to extinguish the opportunity that the urban revolutionists would steal his power. Thiswas subsequently confirmed at the May 3rd meeting, which Guevara claimed as the official shifting of all power to thecountryside, that is, to Castro ( Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p.215 ) . The other strategic benefit which Castro obtained from the work stoppages failure was to coerce Batista intoconfrontation. Castro had house control over the Sierra Maestra, but he could non contend Batista s ground forces off fromthere. He needed Batista to direct his military personnels up to the Sierra Maestra, where his guerilla tactics could win. This planworked, as Batista s officers, encouraged by the failed work stoppage, forced Batista to assail the Sierra Maestra and convey anend to the revolution. On June 28, after heavy recruiting, Batista s summer offense began. The dry component of thiswas that most of his recruits were provincials, many from the Oriente state ( Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p.29 ) .However, the Sierra was non the lone topographic point where conflicts had begun, on April 16, Batista declared a province ofemergency, and began the most barbarous crackdown of his government. Partially in protest of this and partially in support ofCastro, the urban revolution escalated, turning the metropoliss into practical battlefields. Due to the really efficient organisation which he had developed, Castro was winning against Batista scampaign. This was a morale encouragement to the revolutionists everyplace. Unit of measurements grew in all sectors, the five to sixthousand urban revolutionists contending during the summer grew more legion, and resistance in the armed forcesincreased ( Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 263 ) . Castro s Rebels so left the Sierra and headed west, capturing cityafter metropolis and climaxing with Santa Clara. During this clip, the urban revolutionists was indispensable to the rebelvictories. The Rebels numbered no more than two 100 and 50, and Batista s ground forces was still in the 10s ofthousands ( Huberman & Sweezy, 1961, p.69 ) . However, in each town, the Batistian ground forces s morale had beenlowered so much by the urban revolutionists that the Rebels seldom needed to fire a shooting to obtain triumph. Anotherprobable cause of the ground forces s deficiency of motive was Batista s inhuman treatment. The soldiers had no desire to contend for a manthat persecuted their friends and households. One last ground could be the repute of Castro and his Rebels, their great, bloody triumph over the regular ground forces was well-known, and few of the poorly trained military personnels wanted to challengethem. Although the Rebels succeeded without the general work stoppage itself, through the urban revolutionists and thetroops deficiency of morale, the same stoping was reached and the Rebels took over urban Cuba despite their lesser Numberss. So the guerillas took over Cuba and declared it a peasant revolution. However, it seems clear that, nomatter how it is judged, the revolution was surely non characterized by the peasantry. The guerrilla-peasant unionwas one of convenience, the provincials were merely the instrument in which the guerillas were forced to run. Theynever spoke of any particular connexion with the provincials until good after the revolution, allow alone aid or swear themany more so they needed to make their ain ends. And in return, the guerillas ne’er received aggregate support fromthe provincials ; they would still fall in Batista s ground forces with the same enthusiasm as they ever had. Even the spearhead ofthe revolution, agricultural reform, was begun by the guerillas, and there is much argument as to whether the peasantsactually cared about acquiring land at all. The beginning of the Land Reform Law stated that its intent was to diversify the Cuban economic system and Help the industrialisation of the state ( Goldenberg, 1966, p.218 ) . Beyond theirexcellent service as watchers the provincials had about no function in the revolution. The urban revolutionists, nevertheless, did play a major, yet forgotten function. At every measure of the revolution, their aid was critical to the guerillas, and at thetime, up until April of 1958, the guerillas recognized this. Afterwards, the aid continued to be necessary, but itwas taken in under Castro s provincial revolution. The inquiry can now be asked: why did the revolutionists, after their triumph, seek so difficult to set up theirrevolution as a provincial revolution? This reply is found in Cuba s unusual category construction at the clip of therevolution. Cuba was non a typical Latin American state ; foremost, its population was 57 % urban and 43 % rural, asopposed to the rural nature of the remainder of Latin America ( Draper, 1962, p.21 ) . It had one of the highest criterions ofliving in Latin America, and it was besides one of the most in-between category: figures range from 22 % up to 33 % of thepopulation being in-between category ( Thomas, 1977, p.328 ) . This in-between category was besides unusual because it was a frustratedclass repressed by the economic stagnancy that hindered their professional and fiscal promotion. AlthoughHuberman and Sweezy claim that the peasantry was the most radical of categories, as it was the most marginalized ( 1961, p.80 ) , by other criterions the in-between category would look the most radical, as it was a clear campaigner for arebellion of lifting expectancy. This seems to be the instance, since most of the urban revolutionists were and guerrillaswere of this in-between category. Batista s power was founded with these people, hence he could hold handled a true peasantrevolt because the peasantry was non strong plenty. However, a in-between category revolution could hold been hisdownfall. The constituency of the Cuban revolution was made up of the in-between category, it derived its support from themiddle category by assuring to honour the fundamental law of 1940 with its broad reforms, and it succeeded without thesignificant worker or peasant support. After the work stoppage of April 1958 the revolution, antecedently a rebellion of the middle-class intellectuals, becameCastro s ain revolution. He made the work stoppage fail to consolidate his power, irrespective of the bloodshed it caused hisfellow revolutionists. This would look to be one of the grounds why he termed it a peasant revolution. He reversedcause and consequence to warrant what happened. He claimed that the triumph was the triumph of a provincials revolution, ofwhich he was simply a front man, swept into the category consciousness of the peasantry. Alternatively he had swept theurban leaders off the phase, and in order to conceal the fact that it was really he and his ain officers who had seizedthe authorities, he created the peasant nature of the revolution. Then, following up on this lead, one time he was inpower he changed the agricultural reform jurisprudence by adding socialist co-operatives before it was signed, therefore driving awayliberal in-between category in the name of the peasant revolution ( Draper, 1962, p.24 ) . He was so popular at that point that hecould draw such a manoeuvre without a battle, so he consolidated his power and based it, unlike his revolution, onthe peasantry and the workers. The concluding ground why it seems that he constructed the peasant nature of the revolution was to give therevolution the popular support it needed to be accepted in the remainder of Latin America. Our revolution has set anexample for the every other state in Latin America ( Lavan, 1967, p.13 ) , said Che Guevara. As mentioned before, Cuba was far in front of most of Latin America economically, and so most of the remainder of the continent had the potentialfor a echt provincial rebellion. The success of this scheme is apparent in the monolithic popularity of Castro among peasantmovements in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru ( Goldenberg, 1966, p.313 ) . When he eventually took power, Castro did consequence many societal alterations to better the provincial conditions.Indeed, it does non look that he went through so many transmutations merely to accomplish entire personal power, but thathe was looking finally to consequence extremist societal alteration every bit good. That the manner to these two ends, along with thedistress of foreign policy, all coincided was advantageous. That his fellow in-between category urban revolutionists had tobe removed was simply a cagey necessity But no affair what the state may look like now, or what the leadershave said refering the revolution, it still remains that while the urban revolutionists likely could non havedefeated Batista without Castro, it is certain that Castro could non hold defeated Batista without the urbanrevolutionaries.

310