Finnish Maritime personnel’s conceptions on safety management and safety culture
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to discover the Finnish maritime personnel’s
conceptions ofsafety management and its relationship with the idea of safety culture. This thesis isa contribution to the geographical research of organisation (see, for instance, Del Casinoet al. 2000; Audia, 2015; Müller, 2015) and the geographical research of ships (see, forexample, Hasty & Peters, 2012; Anim-Addo et al. 2014).
1.1
Background
Over twenty years has handed because the Ro-Ro ship Estonia capsized and sank 28thSeptember 1994. But, the accident appears to resurface within the media close to the anniversarydays (Iltalehti 22.9.2014; Kaleva 27.9.2004; Savon Sanomat 28.9.2008; Tekniikka jatalous 28.9.2009)
The accident precipitated a nationwide trauma, significantly within the vessel’s flag
state Estonia and in Finland and Sweden. A lot of the passengers have been from thesecountries and the many of the crew members have been Estonian (JAIC, 1997).The accident was investigated totally by the Joint Accident InvestigationCommission
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(JAIC, 1997). The accident investigation and associated scientific studiesrevealed a number of issues inside the safety culture of the maritime trade (Hänninen,2007; Kristiansen, 2005).The accident of Estonia was not the primary deadly accident drawing consideration to inadequatemaritime safety culture. The accident investigations of the Herald of Free Enterprise andthe Scandinavian Star revealed deadly issues inside the maritime safety culture as nicely(Division of Transport, 1987; Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005). In theinvestigations it was concluded that the transport firms operated in a competitivemanner and aimed to maximise their earnings on the expense of safety. Safety culturedeficiencies have been discovered amongst the transport firm management in addition to ship
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A “Joint Accident Investigation Fee” between Estonia, Finland and Sweden for the investigationof the capsizing of the passenger vessel MV ESTONIA on 28 September 1994 was arrange on 29September 1994. The Fee consists of three members from every state and was chaired by one ofthe members from Estonia, the flag state of MV ESTONIA.
Jouni Lappalainen
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crews. The accident investigations revealed that the management weren’t dedicated tosafety and the crew members weren’t participative in relation to safety (Division ofTransport, 1987; Robinson, 1999; Kristiansen, 2005; Gill & Wahner, 2012). Accordingto Hänninen (2007), the transport firms and the transport trade weren’t capableof executing corrective measures resulting from the truth that the danger dealing with measures and therisk management methods have been underdeveloped inside the maritime trade(Hänninen, 2007; see additionally Gill & Wahner, 2012; Hystad & Bye, 2013)As a response to those critical maritime accidents and different issues inside safetyculture, the IMO enacted the Worldwide Management Code for the Protected Operation ofShips and for Air pollution Prevention (Worldwide Safety Management (ISM) Code)(Schröder-Hinrichs et al. 2013; Hystad & Bye, 2013; Xue et al. 2015). The ISM Coderequires that the transport firm ought to implement a safety management system.There was sturdy perception that implementing a safety management system would consequence ina safety culture:
”Certainly,
the right implementation of the ISM Code
ought to lead to a safety culture.”(ISF, 2010)
The aim of the ISM Code is to supply a global commonplace for the safemanagement and operation of ships and for air pollution prevention. The ISM Coderequire
s that “each Firm ought to develop, implement and preserve a Safety
Management System (SMS)
”
(IMO, 1993). The ISM Code is taken into account to be the firstmaritime regulatory instrument that determines specified duties to a companyand its management with regard to safety (Anderson, 2003; see additionally Schröder-Hinrichset al.2015).The ships that have been visited throughout this research sailed largely within the Baltic Sea space, withthe exception of 1, which sailed within the Crimson Sea in the course of the go to. The geographicalcharacteristics of the Baltic Sea pose a number of challenges to maritime safety. Forexample, in accordance with Finnish maritime pilots, the navigational circumstances are difficultin the Finnish waters, as a result of the routes are slender, and there are numerous turns anddangerous rocks (Lappalainen et al. 2014b). On the northern a part of the Baltic Sea, the
Finnish Maritime personnel’s conceptions on safety management and safety culture
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navigational difficulties enhance in the course of the winter, as a result of the ocean will be ice-coveredfor a number of months (Valdez Banda et al. 2015). Due to the dense maritime visitors inthe Baltic Sea, the world is acknowledged as one of many busiest vessel-operated areas in theworld (Brunila & Storgård, 2012). Moreover, the visitors is anticipated to extend in thefuture, particularly as a result of enhance in maritime transport to and from the brand new Russianports in Primorsk and Ust-Luga (Kujala et al. 2009; Brunila & Storgård, 2012).Nonetheless, the transport statistics of the Baltic Sea from the years 2009, 2010 and 2013have indicated some lower in transport actions (HELCOM, 2014).It’s anticipated that the expansion of maritime oil transportation, particularly, will increasethe danger of maritime accidents within the Baltic Sea (see for instance Kujala et al. 2009;Zhang et al. 2015). Primarily based on the visitors information gathered by the Automated IdentificationSystem (AIS) and incident experiences, the spatial distribution of probabilistic accidents hasbeen evaluated, and probably harmful locations, or so known as sizzling spots, have beenidentified in varied elements of the Baltic Sea (Marcjan & Cucma, 2010; Montewka et al.2010; Goerlandt & Kujala, 2011; Laine, 2015; Przywarty et al. 2015; Zhang et al.2015). Particular consideration has been paid to the danger of an oil accident by analysing thespatial distribution of visitors flows, accidents and incidents and oil spreads fashions(Lehikoinen et al. 2015). The dominating accident varieties are grounding and collision(Kujala et al. 2009; HELCOM, 2014). In keeping with HELCOM
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statistics (HELCOM,2014) collisions (collisions and contacts) have been the primary sort of accidents in 2013,accounting for 38% of the accidents in complete, whereas groundings accounted for 29% of theaccidents (see Figure1
