The war between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan lasted more than 9 years from 1979 to 1989 (Reuveny & Prakash, 1999). Hundreds of thousands of civilians died, and thousands of Soviet troops and Afghan troops were killed during the conflict to include Mujahideen fighters. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Taliban began to rise and gain power in Afghanistan (Reuveny & Prakash, 1999). The Soviets left an arsenal of weapons, munitions, tanks, mortars, grenades, artillery, and other military equipment throughout Afghanistan because of the war conflict. The Taliban used this equipment in their rise to power in the 1990s and 2000s. Today, when leaving a war conflict, the United States attempts to destroy or remove/relocate as much military equipment and munitions as possible.
Do you believe that if the Soviet Union had destroyed its arsenal of weaponry and military equipment after the withdrawal in 1989 that the Taliban would have gained power? Would it have reduced terrorism in Afghanistan? Why, or why not?
ANSWET THE ABOVE DISCUSSION AND THEN REPLY TO MY CLASSMATE’S RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTION AND EXPLAIN WHY YOU AGREE? (A MINIMUM OF 200 WORDS EACH) Your responses should be substantive in context and content and further the academic discussion (challenging and inquiry).
This is an interesting question. I believe that, first, we have to remember that the Soviets were on the brink of losing the war; hence, the withdrawal of troops in 1989. This war ultimately proved to be the launching pad of the collapse of the Soviet Union or, more formally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. According to Çiçek (2015), “…the war in Afghanistan, together with economic, social, and leadership-based factors, played a key role in the collapse of the Soviet Union by bringing to light the military and economic insufficiencies of the Soviet System…” Therefore, is it possible to conclude that these military insufficiencies could have included no plan for retrieval of military equipment and weapons left in Afghanistan? It is well-established that there was no formalized exit plan for Russian troops. It is reasonable to conclude that Russia provided the tools necessary to the mujahedeen, the guerilla fighters in the nations of Islam, and this is what gave possible rise to the Taliban. After all, a mujahedeen is the term for a person who engages in Jihad. “While the Soviet troops left, all the military bases and training centers of the mujahedeen in Pakistan remained. Soviet military aid to the Republic of Afghanistan was stopped, but the supply of weapons and ammunition to the mujahedeen continued” (Saradzhyan, 2019). Therefore, I believe the Taliban would not have gained power had it not been for the military surplus left behind by Russia.
It’s difficult to state whether Russia removing or destroying its arsenal of weaponry and military equipment would have reduced terrorism in Afghanistan. After all, there is a known relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. “Today the Afghan Taliban collaborate in some ways with al-Aqeda and other jidahist groups. The 1980’s jihad against the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan was a turning point for both groups” (Strick et al., 2011). Is it possible the military surplus was able to provide a starting point for what would eventually become terrorist activity in Afghanistan? I believe it’s entirely possible. I believe it certainly led to a surge in the strength of the Taliban which furthered their mission of violence against perceived enemies of Islam. Only in February of last year did the United States sign an agreement to withdraw troops from Afghanistan if the country did not engage in any further acts of terrorism. “This landmark pact…centered on an agreement to withdraw U.S. troops in return for guarantees by the Talian that [the] Afghan territory will not be used for mounting international terrorism” (Threlkeld, 2020). So, my conclusion is that I don’t think it would have reduced terrorism because I still think members of jihadist networks had an agenda. The added “bonus” of military surplus that was left behind was just that – a “bonus” – used to further the cause of groups that developed into terrorist organizations.
REFERENCES
ÇİÇEK, A. (2015). The Quicksand of Afghanistan: The Impact of the Afghanistan War on the Breakup of the Soviet Union. International Journal of Russian Studies, 4(2), 115–134.
Saradzhyan, S. (2019, February 28). Lessons for Leaders: What Afghanistan taught Russian and Soviet Strategists. Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-leaders-what-afghanistan-taught-russian-and-soviet-strategists
Strick, A., Linschoten, V., & Kuehn, F. (2011). Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. https://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf
Threlkeld, E. (2020, March 8). Reading between the lines of Afghan Agreements. Lawfare. https://www.lawfareblog.com/reading-between-lines-afghan-agreements
