Law
Topic:
The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal 2021 in the context of white supremacy and domestic terrorism
Constitutional Challenges to Implementing a Policy Pursuant §1781 within the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2021 (NDAA)
The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal 2021 in the context of white supremacy and domestic terrorism. Use the following link to get a grasp of the over arching topic:
SOURCE:
https://www.lawfareblog.com/2021-ndaa-white-supremacy-and-domestic-extremism
Now, the authors of the above mentioned article, identify several issues with the newest NDAA as it relates to policies to combat white supremacy and domestic terrorism. It also identifies proposals that appeared in earlier versions of the bill, but did not make it into the final version because of potential Constitutional issues. However, I want you to focus on the following three paragraphs in the article that deals with proposal §1781 that did not make into the final version signed into law:
Coordinating Domestic Terrorism Threat Assessments
The version of the NDAA passed by the House in July 2020 included a provision (§ 1781) requiring the FBI, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (an intelligence office within the Department of Homeland Security) and the National Counterterrorism Center to draft a report for Congress that “includes an Assessment of the nature and extent of the domestic terror threat and domestic terrorist groups.” Section 1781 further provided that this report must describe the manner in which domestic terror activity is tracked and reported; identify all known domestic terror groups, whether formal in nature or loosely affiliated ideologies, and their respective ideologies; and describe the efforts of such groups, if any, to infiltrate or target certain domestic groups. This section also did not make it to the final version of the NDAA signed into law.
“The FBI and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis routinely issue assessments and reports on domestic terrorist threats and activities. (Due to certain legal and policy issues pertaining to reporting on domestic activities, the National Counterterrorism Center has played less of a role in this area.) Accordingly, the key issue that § 1781 is seeking to address is not the creation of assessments and reports concerning domestic terrorism but, rather, the creation of such products that represent the unified (and not disparate) understanding of the federal department and agencies vested with domestic counterterrorism missions. The type of coordination required to develop such a domestic terrorism report can also serve as a basis to better assess the overlapping roles and responsibilities of these federal agencies in order to streamline efforts and eliminate duplication in this area. Accordingly, the Biden administration should consider adopting similar reporting and assessment requirements as part of its broader framework to combat white supremacy and domestic extremism.
However, the Biden administration should be cautious not to adopt § 1781 in its entirety. More specifically, the administration should avoid implementing § 1781’s requirement that federal agencies “identify all known domestic terror groups” as such a process could implicate constitutional and other legal concerns related to the designation of domestic organizations as terrorist groups. Accordingly, any directive issued by the incoming administration to implement requirements similar to those outlined in § 1781 should focus on having the law enforcement and intelligence communities working in concert to develop a mutual and compressive understanding of significant domestic terrorist threats to the United States (and not on designating domestic terrorist groups).”
I want your final papers to discuss the Constitutional challenges to implementing a policy pursuant §1781, which requires that federal agencies “identify all known domestic terror groups, whether formal in nature or loosely affiliated ideologies, and their respective ideologies; and describe the efforts of such groups, if any, to infiltrate or target certain domestic groups.” Also, understand the distinction between identifying known domestic terror groups and creating domestic terrorism risk/threat assessments; and why the former creates Constitutional challenges as opposed to the latter, which may not. You can identify one Constitutional challenge or multiple ones; whichever approach you take is entirely up to you.
Your paper should be 15-20 pages, including bibliography. I will offer you additional resources that may help you in writing your paper below:
Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s894/BILLS-116s894is.xml
Also, if you do a Google search for “domestic terrorism and white nationalism” a multitude of resources will appear on the first page.
Introduction
In recent times, white nationalist terrorism has increasingly become a threat to the United States. The incidents of domestic terrorism have been primarily driven by the white supremacists, anti-muslim and anti-government extremists on the far right. More than 25% of the right-wing events and just under 50% of the fatalities within these incidents were caused by individuals supporting the white supremacy ideology or claimed to be part of groups that espoused that ideology (Darinikat, 2021). Considering that the deaths from the right-wing extremist attacks and plots extensively shrouded those coming from the far left, it was prudent that Americans understood the gravity of the threat that is steadily worsening by the day (Darinikat, 2021).
Notably, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2021 (NDAA) was enacted to be a reliable legislative vehicle for various policy issues (congressional research Service 2021). It would include fundamental requirements for the federal agencies to handle white supremacy and domestic terrorism., the recent siege in Capitol hill brought this matter to the forefront hence needed to be handled better. Some of its provisions include mandating particular departments and agencies to implement new strategies and programs that will ensure better Assessments, analysis, and contrast the white supremacy happening abroad, such as how Moscow has supported the racially and ethnically motivated terrorists (Stransky, 2021).
Section 1781 of the NDAA was one of the provisions passed in the House in July 2020 but did not make it to the final version of the Act that was signed into law. This provision required the FBI, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the National Counterterrorism Center to provide a report to Congress that will delineate the nature and extent of the domestic terror threat and respective groups after proper Assessment. There have been concerns, precisely constitutional challenges arising from implementing a policy that is according to this section. Therefore, this research paper seeks to understand the respective constitutional challenges and the difference between identifying known terror groups and creating domestic terrorism risk/threat assessments. The discussion will consider why identifying the domestic terror groups causes constitutional problems instead of creating the domestic terrorism risk/threat assessments.
Section 1781 of the NDAA
In this provision, the FBI, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center, provide a report to Congress. This report will evaluate findings on the nature and extent of the domestic terrier threatened by domestic terrorist groups (Stransky, 2021). The provision further provides that the report must depict how the domestic terror activity could be tracked and reported. This entailed identifying the noted domestic terror groups regardless of their nature formalities and the affiliated ideologies. A description of the efforts for the affected groups is also to be provided if they penetrate or aim at particular domestic groups.
The FBI and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis frequently avail assessments and reports on domestic terrorist threats and activities. The National Counterterrorism Center has not fully fulfilled this role due to specific legal and policy issues. Notably, the fundamental matter within the provision is looking to address the creation of assessments and reports that represent the unified comprehension of the federal departments and agencies that are focused on domestic counterterrorism missions (Stransky, 2021). The cooperation needed in developing the respective domestic terrorism report is also essential for an improved assessment of the overlying duties of the different federal agencies hence streamlining all efforts while eliminating any duplication. To this effect, the current United States government should seek to adopt the same reporting and assessment needs as part of the aider framework to reduce white supremacy and domestic extremism.
Nonetheless, as the present Biden administration looks to have the same reporting and assessment required by Section 1781, they need to understand that the provision cannot be adopted in its entirety. Particularly, the government will need to stay away from implementing the requirement of federal agencies identifying the known domestic terror groups since the procedure could embroil constitutional and other legal concerns that have relations to the designation of domestic organizations to be terrorist groups. Therefore, Stransky (2021) advises that the present administration should consider implementing the requirements provided in section 1781, specifically ensuring that the law enforcement and intelligence communities working in tandem for the development of a mutual and compressive understanding of the considerable domestic terrorism threats to the country and not on designating the domestic terrorist groups.
Constitutional Challenges to implementing a policy pursuant §1781 requires that Federal agencies “identify all known domestic terror groups”.
There has been an unending debate on how to appropriately modify the balance between security and liberty, specifically in this era of global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, government leaders realized the need to have measures to protect the country from international terrorists such as Al-Qaida. It was, however, important that the government does not sacrifice civil liberties within their well-meaning efforts of better security. In Olmstead v United States (1928), Justice Brandeis pointed out that experience should provide the lessons specifically the country required to be on its guard to protect its liberty when the government’s objectives are beneficent. He further stated that men born free are naturally alert to fight off an invasion of their liberty by the lewd rulers. The considerable dangers to liberty sneak in through deceptive intrusions by zealous men with good intentions but poor understanding.
This section discusses the constitutional challenges related to identifying the known domestic terror groups as proposed by §1781.
Designation of Domestic Organizations
Regarding domestic terrorist organizations, the legislation has not provided a clear definition of terrorism and domestic terrorists. There is no purely domestic terrorism statute to guide the country. Despite the lack of a legal mechanism in the country to label the purely domestic organizations as terrorist organizations, the mechanisms to designate the foreign actors are many. This already forms a fundamental challenge for Section 1781 is explicitly applied to the agencies having to identify the domestic terrorist groups. An individual could be charged with domestic terrorism following different sections within Title 18 of the United States Code for executing a particular attack. Still, the membership to a domestic organization solely has not been criminalized. Therefore, in a situation such as Trump threatening to designate Antifa was not substantial due to the strong free speech protections provided in the country hence causing an immediate challenge in court.
Any designation happening locally will need to be done in relation to the United States law enforcement history of violence against minority groups, specifically the African Americans, and its connivance to white supremacist violence. The protections of free speech cannot solely explain why politicians and public members will consistently refer to Black Lives Matter as a terrorist organization while the violence perpetrated by the self-acknowledged white supremacists. The latter are considered cases of mental illness. Also, they fail to explain the country-wide calls for the previous Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to resign after her agency produced a report on the prevalent threat of right-wing extremism (CNN Politics, n.d.). However, a similar outcry for the resignation of Mayor Wison Goode was not heard during the deaths of eleven countrymen after Philadelphia Police bombed the residential; compound that belonged to Black Liberalization Organization (MOVE).
The examples point out similar lessons demonstrated by the international terrorist organizations: a terrorist label -even when a formal legal mechanism is non-existent- indicates the kinds of political behavior that go beyond being non-ideal to unacceptable that is commonly linked with racial and ethnic lines. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) committing violence is non-ideal, which is the people of color activities challenging prevailing institutions that have given white supremacists privilege similar to the actions of Black Lives Matter is considered unacceptable. When public sentiments shifts in terms of the acceptable or unacceptable kinds of political violence, the terrorist designations will permit the government to alter the margins while preserving the ideologies of the preferred narrative concerning the United States initial white supremacist terrorist designation, the selection of Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) had more significant symbolic currency during an era of increasing far-right extremism while still being a low-cost step in failing to condemn the specifically US-based organizations that was linked to it, Atomwaffen Division, a self-described Nazi organization.
Furthermore, the fact that mechanisms to designate the terrorists may have minimal impact if the proper authorities are unwilling to go after the organizations that are considered terrorists. Essentially, the City of Philadelphia failed to have substantial legal backing to call “MOVE” a terrorist organization. Still, the wording was used to justify the tactics towards the group prior to and after the bombing. The designation of an organization solely has the most negligible impacts on the organization’s capabilities except when 5the respective agencies have allocated adequate resources required to exert pressure on the organization. Conversely, failing to designate an organization could mean that the officials consider it “terrorist” with all affiliated normative baggage. Also, the government agencies may still select to go after the group with no designation as they have done previously. Counterintuitively, then, the hypothetical domestic designation may be a simple reinforcement of broadly held perception about what kinds of actors are terrorists and those that are not. The threat by Trump to designate Antifa as a terrorist organization may, therefore, not have any considerable legal weight. Still, it may gesture to the public and law enforcement the unacceptable form of contention before the administration’s eyes (Docxee, 2020). The “terrorism” language has more considerable implications on how the state will deal with the non-state actors than other official terrorist designations.
Notably, it is also considered a mistake to have a formal designation for the domestic terrorist organizations in the country. This is because of the decentralized essence of the terrorism threat in the country that causes an inefficient allocation of resources that could negatively impact the already marginalized groups (Docxee, 2020). The designation of particular organizations as a terrorist would also be less meaningful since the primary terrorist threat in the country emanates from the loose networks of extremists and individual actors instead of the discrete organized groups. The networks and persons will constantly radicalize and mobilize people on online platforms. Still, most movements get their inspiration from the “leadership resistance” movement with no formal leadership and structure, which has been made famous by the white nationalists. This puts limitations on the respective measures implemented by law enforcement or the prosecution of the affiliated persons. Without having the right discrete groups to focus on, the domestic terrorist designations become ineffective in controlling the financial flow or the activities of individuals (Docxee, 2020). Therefore, rather than focussing on the extensively symbolic action, the government would instead take up the data-driven measures to redirect resources and policy efforts in the data groups of domestic extremists posing the substantial threat.
1. The USA Patriot Act
It is with good reason that legislators are understandably angry. They are dealing with increased violence threats to themselves, their employees, and their families. Undoubtedly, they needed to deal with something to deal with the intimidators and those that cause physical harm. Nonetheless, the hastily crafted laws are dangerous and often lead to undesired effects. For instance, when the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was passed after a frenzied 1960s, it was never expected that it would be imposed on the anti-abortion protesters or the federal government would later look into using the law against Black Lives Matter and Antifa (Jenkins, 2021). The USA Patriot Act is presently considered the prototype for domestic terrorism legislation, aced through Congress in three days to allow a controversial expansion of surveillance on the country’s people. Yet, the sponsors of the bill did not envision this (Jenkins, 2021).
The USA Patriot Act implementation was one way that numerous individuals believed that the government has intruded on their liberty. This is in conjunction with the respective expansions and amendments done out of altruistic motives, including combating the evident terrorism evils. However, concerns still prevail whether the provisions were implemented while fully understanding the constitution and the First Amendment. Considering the fact that the Act and other global terrorism laws do not provide a template to deal with domestic political violence, which has an entirely distinct historical context, applying it in the designation of domestic terror groups already raises legal challenges under the First Amendment. For instance, the law seems to search for a domestic version of the Act’s material support provision, which has criminalized the provision of material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (Jenkins, 2021). Interpretations from prosecutors on the material support widely referred to the participation in propaganda activities, fundraisers, and even group membership with no necessity to demonstrate a connection to advancing terrorism. Applying this definition to the domestic environment and respective organizations, legal concerns relating to the First Amendment begin to arise.
Additionally to the material support and resources provision, Section 805(a)(2)(B) included the provision of expert advice or Helpance to define the material support to these terrorists (Hudson, 2012). This provision has been considered unlawful by several organizations and citizens. During the Clinton administration, a case was filed for the provision of legal, non-violent activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam, which the Secretary of State considered to be international terrorist organizations (Hudson, 2012). The plaintiffs stated that the ban on the provision of expert Helpance and advice was unconstitutionally hazy and could hinder the exercise of the protected First Amendment activities, including offering legal Helpance to the groups who wanted to petition the United Nations and negotiate peace agreements or offering advice on international law. The provision is among the most extreme laws within the Act as it has criminalized pure speech without providing any requirements that the government could demonstrate that the speech does have links to terrorism. In the Case of Humanitarian Law Project v Ashcraft, the District Judge stated that the language of expert advice and Helpance was vague (Casetext, n.d.). The expert advice or Helpance sought to be offered by the plaintiffs encompassed the advocacy and associational activities that are accorded by the First Amendment, which the defendants acknowledged not being prohibited by the Patriot Act. However, the Act also fails to limit the kind of expert advice and Helpance given. Instead, it has prevented the provision of all of it without considering its nature (Hudson, 2012). While the court did not determine the law at the time to be overboard, they stated that applied litigation would avail an adequate safeguard or the violations to the First Amendment.
Notably, a vital dispute arose in the case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, where the government ruled in favor of the government to reject the First Amendment and other constitutional challenges. It indicated that the government could prevent advice or training on peaceful operations to the designated terrorist groups. Therefore, this causes an unending tiff on what should receive the most attention, whether the ideological groups that support any forms of terrorism or look into upholding the constitutional rights that have been rightfully granted to United States citizens.
According to Section 802 of the Patriot Act, the terrorism definition expanded to include “domestic” in contrast to international terrorism. An individual will engage in domestic terrorism if they act dangerously to human life as it is a violation of the state and federal criminal laws (ACLU, 2021). The actions to be classified here will need to show intentions towards the coercion or intimidation of the civil population, influencing a government policy through intimidation or coercion and affecting government conduct through mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. Furthermore, the actions will need to happen mainly within the United States territorial jurisdiction, and in case they are external events, they are considered international terrorism (ACLU, 2021). This section did not create a new crime of domestic terrorism but expanded the type of behavior that the government could conduct investigations to investigate “terrorism”. The Act did expand the governmental powers to look into terrorism, with some of the powers applying to domestic terrorism.
Notably, domestic terrorism has a broad definition, including several prominent activist campaigns and organizations. Organizations such as Greenpeace, Vieques Island, and Environmental Liberation front have all in the recent past engaged in activities that would subject them to investigations for engagements in domestic terrorism. This is what the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is fighting against. The Act needs to limit domestic terrorism that entails breaking criminal laws and endangering human life (ACLU, 2021). The peaceful organizations that dissent from government policies without breaking any laws cannot be targeted (Department of Justice, 2021). Peaceful political discourse and dissent are among the fundamental freedoms accorded to Americans and should not be subjected to domestic terrorism investigations. The implementation of identifying terror groups following Section 1781 will only be limiting the exercise of these freedoms.
The criminal prosecution of persons who violate the law is not opposed by the ACLU even when doing it for political reasons. Nonetheless, the opposition is to the broad definition given to terrorism and the authority that will arise from the definition. Therefore, the ACLU suggests having the scope of conduct falling within the domestic terrorism definition narrowed, such as the acts that cause severe physical injuries or death instead of all the dangerous acts to human life. The narrower definition will not include organizations and persons engaging in minimal actions of property damage or violence.
The FBI also does not formally designate domestic terrorist organizations but has overtly set forth domestic terrorist threats (Congressional Research Service, 2021). The agency identified the respective threats to encompass criminal activities, particular activities such as the Proud Boys, or persons who adhere to a particular ideology, including the Antifa. Although the FBI confirmed in a public hearing that the extremists are subjects to the prevailing domestic terrorism investigations, it has declined to designate any organizations domestic terrorist organization (Congressional Research Service, 2021). They acknowledge that it would be an infringement on the free speech protections provided by the First Amendment, considering it is not a crime in the country to belong to a specific ideological organization. Director Wray indicated that the FBI is not investigating ideology and not investigating violence during Congressional testimony in July 2019. While the persons that were part of the Capitol attack may be part of extremist organizations or adhere to particular ideologies, the federal government also declines to designate the groups as domestic terrorist organizations and instead focus on the violent criminal actions of the individuals regardless of being members to these groups or not.
It is also important to note that it is challenging to develop a designation process that will not infringe upon the first amendment rights and risking to harm the marginalized communities (Docxee, 2020). The designation could move towards coding specific ideologies or grievances as terrorism which is a challenging standard to establish without impeding speech or demonstration. This could prevent or unlawfully target the political dissidents and the organizations or groups that advocate for equal treatment and have historically been at the mercy of law enforcement. They include the racial and ethnic minorities, the LGBTQIA+ community. Coincidentally, the members of these groups are more likely to be targetted for terrorist attacks; the respective concerns have been raised by non-governmental organizations in the country and reiterated by experts from the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner dealing with human rights.
The politicized nature of terrorism research and the polarized political climate with thin the country also exacerbate the challenge of deliberate partisan abuse of the domestic terrorism designation. Therefore, the definitions and applications of the word terrorism will continue to cause controversy and be shaped by political agendas. For instance, Republicans are pushing for the penalization of far-left organizations such as Antifa. At the same time, the Democrats advocate for stringent restrictions in the far-right groups, including the militia movement (Docxee, 2020). Some commentators indicate that the FBI has already implemented surveillance and counterterrorism measures equivalently against the activists of the left-wing and African Americans for a long time (Docxee, 2020). The designations would avail another mechanism to rescind political dissent, specifically if utilized in prosecuting individuals who widely denied material support for the dissident movements.
Subsequently, the calls for the government to designate groups such as the KKK as domestic terrorist organizations will less be about the official designation process but an expression of public frustrations towards the actual and perceived lack of actions towards dealing with the threat of white supremacist terrorism (Docxee, 2020). One specific critical point is the present resources and policy attention to international terrorism despite enough proof from the essential agencies that the country’s primary terrorist threat is from the white supremacist networks. Therefore, improving the country’s response to domestic terrorism should be in recognizing and applying the prevailing definition of domestic terrorism as per Statute 18 of the U.S. Code 2331(5) (Docxee, 2020). Other recommendations include the proposals to expand the definition and government mandating a centralized data collection and transparent reporting. The latter information collected will direct the federal counterterrorism resources for prioritizing and responding to substantial threats (Docxee, 2020). The country’s intelligence and law enforcement has shown effectiveness in p[rotecting the country from external terrorist threats. Therefore, they need to have and allocate the resources and political support needed for streamlined adaption of the skills and techniques to respond to the evolving domestic terrorism threat.
Focussing On The Creation of the Domestic Terrorism Risk/Threat Assessments As Depicted by Section 1781 of the NDAA.
The analysis of one of the aims of Section 1781, specifically identification of the domestic terror groups, has shown that it will involve dealing with extensive constitutional or legal challenges. These agencies will be undergoing more turmoil in identifying these organizations, not from the stresses of identifying them but from the legal processes from the infringement of rightfully accorded freedoms to American citizens. It would not be advisable for the current presidency to implement the section in its entirety to this effect.
Notably, focusing on creating the domestic terrorism/ threat assessments should not put these agencies in jeopardy of dealing with the evolving domestic terrorism threat. These threat assessments include the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which will provide the best and better picture understanding of the entire intelligence community on a fundamental challenge affiliated with severe uncertainties. The estimates are long-term in the possible direction followed by a potential issue or threat. Regarding domestic terrorism, the proper authorities will assess the risk and threat in terms of historical information and the path the threat was taking in the near and extended future.
The respective agencies are to engage in national domestic intelligence collection efforts that will focus on domestic terrorism and related explicitly to white supremacy. The intelligence related to the crime will follow collecting, evaluating, assessing, and analyzing raw information from various sources (ODIHR, 2014). This ensures that the agencies are not looking at particular people or groups to be targetted. The sources will be concerned with the nature of the crime, how the criminals work and are structured, the time, location, profiles, and identity of victims (Scheimer, 2021). Most of the information could be gained from open sources, while other kinds that are confidential could be obtained via covert ways such as using SITS. For legal purposes, intelligence will need to be collected, stored, processed, disseminated, and utilized in stringent compliance with national laws’ global human rights standards (ODIHR, 2014).
A better sense of scope has been found to aid the policymakers, especially when it is publicly proffered by the federal government (Congressional Research Service, 2017). The executive branch agencies could provide annual statistics on domestic terrorism, prosecutions pointing out persons, and the dynamic movements. The legislation could also consider making requests for comprehensive annual public reports that count and describe the respective terrorist plots that have been dismantled, the investigated attacks, and the involved agencies regardless of level (Congressional Research Service, 2017). The lack of this accounting makes it challenging for respective stakeholders to exercise proper oversight that compares the levels of domestic terrorist activity against the items such as homegrown violent activities, among others (Congressional Research Service, 2017). the policymakers will use the information to provide a proper assessment of the government to respond to the domestic tourism threat, compare different threats, ensure proper allocation of resources to particular counterterrorism efforts, and accurately measure the federal funding allocated to the threat.
Generally, threat assessments aim to ensure that information is shared in all directions across the intelligence agencies and on time. This will point to each community having a counterterrorism point of contact to ensure that information is shared across all sides; balance has been a significant problem in the counterterrorism efforts; hence there are cases where they infringe on others’ constitutional rights (Wright, 2014). Therefore, bringing together the investigative powers and resources to assess this threat and determine how to handle it should enable this balance. Also, the process will encompass bringing in the public safety agencies, critical partners from other disciplines such as community leaders to work with the government. To this effect, the development of a balanced-power approach developed from a comprehensive domestic threat assessment that uses both hard-power and soft-power strategies to work with and focus in the communities that are a target to terrorists for various purposes (Wright, 2014).
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, Section 1781 of the NDAA aimed to reduce the evolving domestic terrorism threat in the country. However, part of it required particular agencies to identify the domestic terror groups in the country. However, an analysis of this matter would demonstrate that the process would give rise to constitutional or legal challenges that would impede their objective. Therefore, it is prudent that it is not implemented in its entirety instead focus on creating respective risk or threat assessments.
References
ACLU. (2021). How the USA Patriot Act redefines “Domestic terrorism”. American Civil Liberties Union. https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism
Casetext. (n.d.). Humanitarian law project v. Ashcroft. Casetext: Best Legal Research Software | #1 Rated. https://casetext.com/case/humanitarian-law-project-v-ashcroft-2
CNN Politics. (n.d.). Napolitano defends a report on right-wing extremist groups – CNN.com. CNN International – Breaking News, U.S. News, World News, and Video. https://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/15/extremism.report/
Congressional Research Service. (2017, August 21). Domestic terrorism: An overview. Every CRS Report – EveryCRSReport.com. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44921.html#_Toc491092821
Congressional Research Service. (2021). Defense Primer: Navigating the NDAA. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10516.pdf
Congressional Research Service. (2021). Domestic Terrorism and the Attack on the U.S. Capitol. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11573
Darinikat. (2021, April 12). Monday reads Domestic terrorism and white nationalism. Sky Dancing. https://skydancingblog.com/2021/04/12/monday-reads-domestic-terrorism-and-white-nationalism/
Department of Justice. (2021). Dispelling the myths. https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/subs/u_myths.htm
Docxee, C. (2020, December 1). Bad idea: Domestic terrorist organization designations. Defense360. https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-domestic-terrorist-organization-designations/
Hudson, D. L. (2012). Patriot Act. Freedom Forum Institute | Champions of the First Amendment. https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/libraries-first-amendment-overview/patriot-act
Jenkins, B. M. (2021). Five reasons to be wary of new domestic terrorism law. https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/02/five-reasons-to-be-wary-of-a-new-domestic-terrorism.html
ODIHR, O. (2014). Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: a community-policing approach.
Scheimer, D. (2021, February 26). The threat at home: How the U.S. will confront domestic terrorism. WBUR. https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2021/02/26/extremism-abroad-is-the-u-s-ready-to-battle-domestic-terrorism
Stransky, S. (2021, January 20). The 2021 NDAA, white supremacy, and domestic extremism. Lawfare. https://www.lawfareblog.com/2021-ndaa-white-supremacy-and-domestic-extremism
Wright, L. M. (2014). The emerging threat of domestic terrorism: a systematic review of evolving needs, threats, and opportunities.
